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The social, political, and economic forces of industrialization have transformed 
the actors' art, especially the relationship between the performer and the audience. When 
the consolidation of theatre ownership superceded the centuries old tradition of actor- 
management, the transmutation of actors into commodities commenced. With the 
ascendancy of film as the dominant mode of theatrical production this transformation has 
accelerated until the creative interaction of living performers and audience is not merely 
an anomalous curiosity: it is nearly extinct. 
Industrialization has reduced the status of actors and their influence upon the 
workplace. Employment equilibrium has been distorted by the "star system" of 
production preferred by Hollywood: the rate of professional employment for actors is 
15% on a weekly basis and 59% measured annually. Widely disparate rates of 
compensation where the industry-wide average annual salary is less than $10,000 while 
some individual performers with "clout" may earn more than $20 million per film are 
acceptable. In search of the widest possible market, "industrialized" performing arts 
purposefully lower audiences' expectations by relying upon formulaic dramatic texts and 
the over-use of spectacular effects. 
In the twenty-first century, the consequence of industrialization to the performer 
will be doubly dangerous and pernicious. The capitalist system of economic organization 
is now global and seeks to minimize national differences and regional cultural 
individuality in an effort to create the broadest commodity markets. Technology is on the 
verge of digitally creating emotionally believable cinematic performances that threaten to 
widen the gulf between performers and audiences to a degree that challenges the very 
existence of live performing art. The financial rewards of the actors' obsolescence may 
become too great for producers to ignore. 
Many involved in the performing arts consider the situation dire, yet actors, 
whose ignorance of the labor history of the actors' art in America has been deepened by 
the national prejudice against progressive unionism encouraged by the system, are 
generally not aware of how they came to suffer the status quo. The deteriorating 
economic situation of journeyman actors and moribund relationship with the audience is 
not accidental: it results fiom the business practiced by the owners of multi-national 
media conglomerates abetted by the stars who benefit so greatly fiom their dominance. 
This cultural study shall reveal, through general research of American theatre 
history, that the Depression-era Works Progress Administration's Federal Theatre Project 
presents an alternative production model that provides livelihood for actors and 
inspiration for audiences. It shall reveal, by examining the economic scale and financial 
structures of the performing arts, especially movies, that there are adequate resources to 
find such an alternative today. It shall examine how technology threatens the deep 
relationship between actors and their audiences, a relationship that, for now, continues to 
require actors. These resources, currently concentrated in movie distributors' fees, are 
traditionally negotiable as profit-participation for individual talent. This study shall 
propose that artists in the performing arts move beyond the business craft unionism 
encouraged by the conglomerate owners and embrace the unifying conceptions of 
progressive industrial unionism. Only then will performers gain the bargaining power to 
unlock these resources to build a new actors' theatre by negotiating industry-wide profit 
participation through a consortium of industry guilds and unions. 
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Chapter 1 
THEATRE ART OR ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESS: AN OVERVIEW 
Business, like theatre, is a creative endeavor in its own right. It, also like theatre, 
is a social construct, one that is motivated by human impulses. Those impulses that drive 
business, however they may differ from those that inspire the theatre, are ascendant in our 
time and not to be discounted. And while we may wish that the human impulses of 
theatrical art survive and even thrive, it is pointless to wish the business model away. It is 
equally pointless to hope for a return to the historical moment when the United States 
federal government financed a national theatre in the 1930's or pine for that somewhat 
less exciting effort in the 1960's when the federal and state governments together 
established, though hardly endowed, the National Endowment for the Arts and various 
state arts councils. Seeking to re-invent the relationships between artists and audiences, 
and between artists and business folk is, however, much to the point. 
Introduction 
In order to evaluate the perfomer/audience relationship in the twenty-first 
century, it is necessary to examine the economic structures of the acting profession today 
and gain an understanding of the truly gargantuan size of the entertainment industry. It is 
important to understand that the relationship between producers and artists has evolved 
from an entrepreneurial peer relationship among artists to a more hierarchical industrial 
model where capital dominates labor. A study of this evolving relationship through the 
Industrial Revolution into the present indicates that actors, like all creative artists in the 
perfomling arts, e-g., the writers, directors, designers, musicians and craftspeople, are 
increasingly limited in their ability to influence the conditions under which they create. 
Examining the industry's transition f?om the prevalence of many actor-managed 
companies to the domination of a few multinational corporations will also lead to 
considerations of the distribution of profits within the industry. Such considerations beg 
the question of why the overwhelming majority of professionals who create the 
productions now receive such a paltry share of its annual earnings. 
Of course, the means by which the workforce in the performing arts became 
organized m ust a lso b e considered. Labor h istory is e xtremely c onvoluted, w ith m any 
ideologies, m any players and many struggles. C haos might b e the most distinguishing 
feature of labor organizing, while the inexorable consolidation of entertainment financing 
and a reliable, if at times shifty, solidarity among producers might be the most consistent 
hallmarks of the business. Within the entertainment industry, the rise of business 
unionism at the international level has led to the near demise of progressive social 
unionism at the local. Business unionists trade away members' political right to influence 
the conditions within their workplace in exchange for higher returns for their labor 
power. Social unionists see broader social issues of labor solidarity and industrial 
organization as underlying issues equally important as monetary compensation. 
Unfortunately, the producers' ability to exploit the tension between social altruism and 
individual aggrandizement has contributed as much a to the current sad state of affairs as 
has producers' financial clout. This uneven distribution of compensation and employment 
opportunities, i.e. the star system, will also bear scrutiny, more for what opportunities it 
may afford the creative professions, acting among them, than towards furthering its 
demise. No matter how unjust, the current system is not merely generally accepted but 
entrenched as a motivating force for those working within the industry. 
It may instead prove more profitable to take a look at that moment in American 
theatre history when the Federal Theatre Project revealed a popular hunger for theatrical 
art in America and debunked the myth that Americans seek only entertainment and 
diversion. I t  will take this look not for nostalgia's sake, but in search of a model that 
affirms the best art is made when the artist commands, and can also provide examples of 
how i t h as b een done. This evaluation o f t he p lace actors hold i n o ur society and the 
relationship they share with an audience is multi-layered, complicated yet rich in 
possibility. 
It is this paper's premise that live theatrical performance is threatened with real 
extinction. Live theatre is no longer the human interaction it has been through out history 
but has been reduced by the pressures of capitalist industrialization to a commodity of 
singular value. These pressures are increasing with each advance in digital technology, 
every media corporate merger and continuing political acquiescence to the concentration 
of economic power. Certainly, some form of live theatre will likely be preserved though 
more as tourist attraction and historical artifact than vital conversation. Moreover, the 
performers, together with the theatre's other artists, must shape, y& their audience, the 
hture of theatre in America. 
It is the artists' responsibility and theirs alone. Until now, their voices have been 
unheard. They can acquiesce to the demands of the business model or they can seek an 
alternative. They can struggle for an equitable share of the resources that will allow 
theatre as an art to hl ly  exist alongside the entertainment industry or they can continue to 
acquiesce to  the inequity of t  he " star system." They can c reate and operate their o wn 
network of theatres as actors and theatre artists had done for centuries prior to the 
invention of producers or they can continue to hope for work while ignoring the dismal 
employment statistics of their profession. They can redevelop a relationship with 
audiences truly based upon their shared human interests or continue to perform the pulp 
fiction of Hollywood until such banal performance opportunities, and the ability to earn a 
livelihood fkom them, cease to exist altogether. 
How the Business Model Shapes Audience Expectations 
Elmer Rice, American playwright and one-time director of the New York Unit of 
The Federal Theatre Project, declared the American theatre "has always been primarily a 
business enterprise." Writing in The Living Theatre, the published synthesis of his lecture 
course, "Contemporary Theatre," which he taught at the Graduate School of Arts and 
Sciences at New York University in 1958, he described the contributions the non- 
commercial theatres of his day had made to American dranla and theatre as "important" 
but unsustainable. These institutions either "disband[ed] for lack of funds or have 
adopted the practices of the commercial theatre." Indeed: 
The persistent pattern, then, of the professional theatre in America is that 
of a privately financed institution whose investors and managers are 
preponderantly motivated by the hope of monetary profit. It is inevitable, 
therefore, that in the selection of plays for production in the professional 
theatre the producer's estimate of the prospects of commercial success is 
the determining factor. (1 6 1) 
In 1991 Robert Brustein, director, academic, and drama critic for The New 
Republic, published a collection of his critical articles written for that journal between 
1978 and 1991 titled, Reima~ninn American Theatre. Writing about his own and 
subsequent artistic generations that followed Rice, Brustein observes that producers' 
concern for profit continue to exert much the same pressure upon production choices 
during our own as during Rice's lifetime: "a couple of seats to a Broadway show . . . cost 
as much as a couple of shares of IBM; and when the evening's over, you don't even have 
a dividend to show for it. At such prices, any theatergoer is going to stay home unless 
he's promised a blockbuster" (Brustein 5). Though the causes of high ticket prices and 
their consequent effect upon attendance are frequently argued, there is little reason to 
assume the fiscal conservatism that seeks to protect the producer's investment over other 
considerations, creating almost incidentally an artistic product that is "trite and banal," is 
any less prevalent today (6). 
In Rice's generation, the tension inherent in the "relationship between 
commercialism and art" provided the impetus for new theatrical production models 
exemplified by the Neighborhood Playhouse, the Provincetown Players, the Group 
Theatre and the Theatre Guild (Rice 147). In the 1940's and 50's, the non-commercial 
theatre took the form of the resident regional theatre movement which began with the 
Guthrie Theatre in Minneapolis and Arena Stage in Washington, D.C., both striving to 
prove the ability of the American theatre to produce worthy dramas independent of New 
York (Brustein 8). Unfortunately, the same fiscal pressures to produce success began to 
be exerted upon the regional houses just as private foundation and government support 
for the arts failed to keep pace with the growing demands of regional arts endeavors. The 
eventual s olution t o the fiscal d ilemma o f t he r egional theatre m ovement w as t o o nce 
again become "the try-out stations" that winnowed out the most popular productions for 
eventual Broadway presentations. "Certainly, the American resident theatre movement [. 
. .] in many c ities of this country [. . .] is barely distinguishable from the commercial 
theatre in any way except its 501-C3 nonprofit designation" (Brustein 8,9). In this clash 
between artistic production and financial support, Rice doubts there always exists "a clear 
correlation between financial success and artistic merit," arguing that "since no one can 
seriously contend that economic rewards are strictly consonant with artistic talents and 
achievements, it is obvious that there are serious handicaps for the artist and serious 
losses to the general cultural h d "  (1 88). 
How the Business Model Limits Performers' Opportunity 
The commercial pressures that limit opportunities for playwrights, i.e., the 
financially conservative t endency t o favor e stablished p laywrights and revivals o f p ast 
successes over risking new and untried plays and authors, similarly limit the 
opportunities available to actors. At mid-point of the last century, fully ninety percent of 
Dramatist Guild members depended "for their subsistence upon other forms of writing or 
on some employment unrelated to writing (Rice, 188-9). Over forty years ago, Rice 
estimated that any actor who worked more than fifteen weeks per year was more 
fortunate than most (189). In 2002, Actors' Equity Association (AEA), the union of 
professional actors, determined that 17,256 of 39,507 members in good standing, less 
than 44%, worked in 2001-02; Equity determined the average weeks worked per working 
member was slightly more than 16 (Pace 2). Clearly, though in "business and in industry, 
year-round employment is the norm, in the theatre it is the exception rather than the rule" 
@ce 190). The result is that 
Most American actors seem to have lost interest in the stage, and those 
that remain are riddled with uncertainty and self-doubt. All the pressures 
of our success-crazed society tell the actor he's a fool to remain with a 
profession that promises little money and less fame when those 
enticements are continually beckoning from LaLa land. As a result, and 
with a great sense of sadness, the resident theatre movement has seen 
some of its most gifted performers end up in vapid TV series or, at best, a 
feature film while the great stage roles go begging. (Brustein 14) 
One might venture to suggest that the theatre is no longer a viable art form, 
simply a vestigial expression of humanity's need to imitate and examine its own 
behavior, a need that is now predominantly satisfied by the cinema and television 
together. If that's the case, why worry about the state of the theatre? If, as President 
Calvin Coolidge once said, the business of America is business, then the fact that, 
according to Brustein, "stars have always been regarded as commodities [. . . and) 
everythmg is esteemed according to how well it sells" (224) should give neither artists 
nor society cause to worry. But if the true business of theatre is something other than 
financial profit, if the art of theatre still offers tangible if not material rewards, then it 
may be "truly alarming . . . when the demand for entertainment threatens to obliterate the 
conditions necessary for the process of art . . . where the barriers protecting the desire for 
quality from the need for profit are disintegrating . . . and the most common standard of 
measurement becomes the balance sheet" (224). Brustein fears the bells of alarm are 
already sounding too late: 
Newspapers will estimate their value by circulation; universities will 
evaluate their courses by enrollment; publishers will rate their books by 
sales; theatres will measure their plays by the box office; galleries will 
appraise their painters by commissions-and society will assess its 
citizenry according to income. The Neilson rating, designed to measure 
responses to mass entertainment, will soon become the technological 
determinant of every activity, no doubt producing the same level of culture 
one finds in network TV . . . a profoundly unnatural condition. It is the 
condition of the bottom line, and it is already exacting an unexpected 
price. (224) 
Tecbnologv's Impact On the Art/Profit/Audience Matrix 
Certainly, the intersection of culture and technology affects artistic achievement. 
At least one consequence of the Renaissance and Age of Reason has been a steadily 
quickening pace of technological invention. This cultural development, eventually 
harnessed to the purposes of economic efficiency during the Industrial Revolution, 
accompanied the transition fiom feudal to mercantile to capitalist society. It encouraged 
theatre's physical development fiom the churchyard to the courtyard to the marketplace. 
Technological invention has changed performance fiom an out-of-doors, weather- 
dependent activity to a plastic art whereby night and day obey command and the 
performance itself possesses infinite possibility of replication. Compared to the 
technological leaps of the past century, the pace of progress over the course of the 
previous five hundred or so seems almost leisurely. 
The technological revolution of the latter part of the Twentieth Century, the 
beginnings of what we've come to call the Information Age, seems likely to impact 
culture to an extent barely imaginable a generation ago. Writing in his 1978 work, 
A r m e n t s  for the Elimination of Television, Jerry Mander quotes Walter Benjamin (a 
German critic whose work preceded that o f M arshall M cLuhan b y some thirty years). 
Benjamin realized that actors' work in the age of film was to portray their own as well as 
their characters' lives through machinery which is incapable of transmitting the 
"quickness" that distinguishes the living from the dead: 
"This situation might be characterized as follows: for the first 
time-and this i s the e ffect o f t he film-man [ the actor] h as to operate 
with his whole living person, yet foregoing [his] aura. For aura is tied to 
his presence; there can be no replica of it. 
The feeling of strangeness that overcomes the actor before the 
camera [. . .] is basically the same kind of estrangement felt before one's 
image in the mirror. But now [with photography and film] the reflected 
image has become separable, transportable.[ . . .] The film responds to the 
shriveling of the aura with an artificial build-up of the 'personality' 
outside the studio. The cult of the movie star, fostered by the money of the 
film industry, preserves not the unique aura of the person but the 'spell of 
the personality,' the phony spell of a commodity." (285-6) 
Citing the adage that "seeing is believing" (246), Mander maintains that despite 
the human propensity to err or misinterpret, there still is a fundamental difference in the 
trustworthiness of images in the modem age compared to all the previous ages of 
mankind: 
Mechanical reproduction of images is the great equalizer. When 
you reproduce any image of anything that formerly had aura (or life), the 
effect is to dislocate the image from the aura, leaving only the image. At 
this point the image is neutral, it has no greater inherent power than 
commodities [. . .] 
By the simple process of removing images from immediate 
experience and passing them instead through a machine, human beings 
lose one of the attributes that differentiate us from objects. Products, 
meanwhile, suffer no such loss and effectively obtain a kind of equality 
with these aura-amputated living creatures shown on television. (285-87) 
The phenomenal growth of the advertising industry in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the post-modem age, is intimately connected to the advent of a new technology, 
television. (134). Its ubiquitous presence in American, indeed, industrialized culture, 
means that "television is the most important single source of images in the world today." 
(240) It is no accident that television is "an inherently more efficient and effective 
medium for advertising than for conveying any information in which life force exists; 
human feeling, human interaction, natural environment, or ways of thinking and being" 
(287). The point is not entirely how mechanical images diminish the life, or aura, of 
human performances. Equally to the point is how the medium, and film as well: 
[. . .] goes a step hrther by constructing drama around the product, 
investing it with apparent life. Since a product has no inherent drama, 
techniques are used to dramatize and enliven the product. Cuts, edits, 
zooms, cartoons and other effects . . . have the effect of adding an artificial 
life force to the product. These technical events make it possible for 
products to surpass in power the images of the creatures whose aura has 
been separated from them by the act of mechanical or electronic 
reproduction. 
So television accomplishes something that in real life would be 
impossible: making products more "alive" than people. (287) 
Mander published his book at the very beginning of the computer revolution in 
film animation and special effects, and it is not far-fetched to assume that digital 
technology will foster the transference of emotional content onto inanimate and 
completely manufactured objects rather better than it will improve its ability to capture 
and portray the emotional reality of living human characters. Mander, again quoting 
Benjamin, goes on to argue: 
"[. . .] that in destroying the aura via the mechanical reproduction of art, 
all art as well as humans and nature lose their grounding, their inherent 
meaning in time and place. . . . The disconnection from inherent meaning, 
which would be visible if image, object and context were still merged, 
leads to a similarly disconnected aesthetics in which all uses for images 
are equal. All meaning in art and also human acts becomes only what is 
invested into them. There is no inherent meaning in anything. Everything, 
even war, is capable of becoming art." (288) 
And if anything can be art, it is simply sound business judgment to create art with the 
least expensive inputs possible. And if the choice should ever arise between the 
performances of human actors or those by digitally created actors, it is clear that the only 
venue where the "aura" of the living actor holds any value is in live performance. It is 
also becoming increasingly clear that the entertainment industry is quickly and steadily 
moving in the direction of virtual actors. 
According to Ross DeVol, director of regional and demographic studies at the 
Milken Institute, an economic research group in Santa Monica, Calif. ". . . there are early 
signs of a critical-mass happening that is helping to make Greater Los Angeles the center 
of two overlapping sections - entertainment and technology" (Marriot 1). These two 
industries are discovering synergy between their niches in the market as entertainment 
projects are often based entirely upon digital products like video games (such as the film 
Mortal Kombat) and video games are created in conjunction with the production and 
release of movies (for instance, Spiderman) (1). Technical advances, more than simply 
expanding the boundaries of theatrical content, are positioned to turn Aristotle's ordering 
of the dramatic elements on its head. 
The increasingly international financing and marketing of entertainment has 
developed sophisticated mass distribution models that overwhelmingly rely upon 
physical action (as opposed to Aristotle's dramatic action) and spectacle to transcend 
language barriers and convey the story (Wasser 357). The transnationalization of the 
production process fiom beginning to end, from conception to frnancing to production to 
distribution, is a "culturaVeconomic phenomenon" where the major Hollywood film 
companies have "ceased to be primarily American, ceased to be institutions of national 
culture. This rupture between audience and producers has reached the acceleration stage 
of an ongoing fifty-year transformation." (345). The transformation began in the 
aftermath of WWII, when Hollywood moved to take the market share the war-devastated 
European film industry could not meet. It continues today in the pressure it exerts upon 
the European performance industry to behave more like Hollywood and produce more 
"stars" (Finney 24). Marketing that can transcend national differences has become a more 
important attribute of filmmaking than textual content that either reflects or appeals to 
specific national characteristics. In such light, it should not be surprising to realize "we 
have no national cultural policy--or [ifJ we do, [we] have a policy by default" (Brustein 
260). 
Actually, the national cultural policy by default is determined by the bottom line 
and is best served by conservative and protectionist measures. Innovation, while 
important, is secondary to proprietary rights as evidenced by the battle between the 
entertainment distributors in Hollywood and the technological innovators of Silicon 
Valley over intellectual property ownership and "fair use" of purchased copyrighted 
material (Plotkin 1). Talent has long considered a conmodity by an  industry that also 
equates the audience with consumers. In such an environment, the actors' economic 
utility for producers easily outweighs their artistic value for audiences. Consequently, it is 
important to recognize that there are effects upon the audience and society as the actors' 
relationship to a picture's profitability is made paramount while the human value of the 
actor is diminished. 
The attraction that the "physical and financial seductions of the West Coast" has 
for the American theatre artists may not, by itself, be enough to make the theatre 
increasingly unimportant and irrelevant. The seemingly limitless production resources 
and personal fortunes available only in Hollywood are only one pole of a magnet that 
pulls the best theatre artists "away fiom the stage." Stage performers, writers, directors 
and technicians, despite declarations that "they find their greatest artistic rewards in the 
applause o f 1 ive audiences," m ight a lso b e s imultaneously and e qually r epelled b y the 
other pole of societal disinterest: 
The glittering prizes in our society don't go to stage actors. The best they 
can hope for is not a knighthood but a Tony, not an OBE but an Obie--or, 
in the case of movie stars, an Oscar, a percentage of the gross, and a house 
in Malibu. Unlike London, New York is not a film center where actors can 
easily alternate stage work with movies and TV. And in a country that 
discriminates against actors in housing, credit-card applications, and 
telephone installations, we still have no respect for the profession. (247- 
48) 
And though film production facilities have become more geographically widespread in 
the past decade, theatrical training and stage work is still judged more favorably as a 
stepping stone towards Hollywood than as a viable career in its own right. Indeed, 
"Broadway is not an isolated business enterprise; rather, as a primary source for new 
dramatic talent and material, it operates in its present form and at its current level of 
activity largely because of the economic interaction which has developed between it and 
Hollywood since the early teens" (McLaughlin 265). 
The successful translation of the 2001 Tony Award-winning stage revival of Bob 
Fosse's Chicago into an Oscar-winning feature film in 2002 continues the traditional 
cross-over business between Broadway and Hollywood. In the last decade, the number 
one media corporation in the world ranked by sales, Hollywood's Disney Corporation, 
(Zielinski 178) has also become a player on Broadway. Disney began staging live 
versions of children's films in 1994 with Beauty and the Beast. Then followed a 
theatrically exciting staging of The Lion King in 1997, and a new version of Verdi's 
classic opera, &a, with music by Tim Rice and Elton John, in 2000. All three are still 
enjoying simultaneous and extended runs on Broadway. Both Lion King and & broke 
new ground with their spectacular staging and offered many more roles to their multi- 
racial casts than most Broadway offerings (though not so many as to make any significant 
impact upon the industry's generally dismal rate of employment). 
Still, if theatre art is akin to conversation over time, audiences today may be more 
artistically underserved than audiences even a generation ago. Revivals have become 
more popular among producers and speculators than ever before, for the obvious reason 
of minimizing financial risk. This nostalgic emphasis and the reworking of familiar 
material to provide opportunity for increasingly spectacular effects tend to place the 
conversation outside the context of day-to-day life: as society seemingly evolves at a 
breakneck pace, the art we use to interpret and understand our own adaptation tends 
towards the conservative and hidebound. The point is not that the entertainment 
experience has no intrinsic validity. Rather, that the financial incentives that motivate the 
ways and means of its creation tends to quiet, if not silence, the artistic conversation 
Technolow's Impact On Performance 
It might be said that actors' futures, never rosy, never looked so bleak. 
Technology's ever more spectacular special effects allow digitally enhanced human 
screen images to perform feats far beyond the humanly possible. Oddly, this rarely 
challenges our suspension of disbelief, but only dampens our emotional connection to the 
story and the other members of the audience sharing it with us. In a sense, however, this 
is only another level of dificulty added to the actor's always-difficult task of capturing 
the audience's imagination. Technology might figure more ominously in contractual 
negotiations between actors and producers, not least being the definition of "motion 
captures," a process where human models are used to create active computer images. 
Producers say the process is not "an area of contract coverage," or acting, while SAG 
maintains that several areas of the current contract, including "puppeteering" govern the 
practice (SAG). Illustrating the importance of the issue is the fact that the pivotal 
character of 'Gollum' in The Two Towers (the middle segment of the Hollywood 
blockbuster trilogy, The Lord of the Rings) is a computer animation developed from 
motion captures of a human actor and dubbed with the actor's voice. 
At least one critic has argued that the performance of Gollum is the movie's most 
humanly dramatic element (Mondello). It remains to be seen if the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences will create a separate category of Oscar award before such a 
performance is nominated as Best Supporting Actor. Also, in May 2002, MIT Professor 
Tomaso Poggio announced the development of computer software that can manipulate 
video imagery of human mouths to enunciate any sequence of words. Thoroughly 
convincing when used with unfamiliar individual's images, this digital manipulation fails 
when used with well-known individuals. Poggio is convinced this is a bug that will soon 
be e liminated (Siegal). Clearly, motion c aptures, digital i maging and voice production 
software threaten the future of human performers and makes the technological 
replacement of actors in movies at least conceivable, if not inevitable. 
Nearly one hundred years after the advent of the movie industry, we find the 
theatre to be nearly wholly subservient to the cinema's needs. Nearly one hundred years 
after the birth of Actors' Equity, we find the economic measurement of the profession to 
be static at best, and under increasing assault from the usual efforts by producers to cut 
labor costs. The 2001 labor negotiations between the Screen Actors' Guild (SAG) and the 
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) and the Alliance of 
Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP), acknowledged that: 
With $20 million paydays for major box office stars, the working men and 
women of the film and television industry, those actors not always in the 
spotlight, are being squeezed. Career actors, the ones who have carved out 
a living making $30,000 to $70,000 a year are a focal point of the current 
contract talks [while] over the years, the actors say, both their initial pay 
and their earnings from residuals, for reruns, have declined. [And though 
producers indicate that] profit margins have decreased, dropping from an 
average of 7 to 9 percent five years ago [I9961 to 2 or 3 percent . . . At the 
same time, they say, the film industry has increasingly turned to bankable 
stars to draw audiences, and competition for their services has driven their 
paychecks skyward, leaving less money to divide among other actors. 
(Whitaker) 
What Is At Stake 
Shakespeare and Moliere and the Greek poets have all bequeathed stories and 
characters that still stir the hearts of humanity centuries after their first telling. Such 
longevity offers hope that artists and audiences today can surmount the difficult 
circumstances of their time and share the stories that arise fiom and continue to deepen 
awareness of their shared humanity. Such longevity might also cause us to remember that 
"it is not surprising that some of the world's greatest dramatists were themselves actors 
(Sophocles, Shakespeare, Moliere)." (Rice 246) That acting was as difficult a profession 
then a s  now i s  likely, a s  i s  the likelihood that themeans b y  which the craft has been 
taught has remained much the same throughout the ages, i.e., by example and experience 
passed fiom one generation to the next. Left to the actors, the art will live forever and 
without thought of personal security. Take for example Gregg Binkley, a middle-class 
actor: 
Who has been making about $50,000 a year [. . .] landed a lead role in 
"Revenge of the Nerds 111" [. . .] supplements his earnings [. . .] hiring 
himself out to conventions impersonating Barney Fife, the comic deputy 
sheriff on "The Andy Griffith Show" [. . .] and just concluded work on an 
unreleased film by the Coen brothers, in which [. . .] he happily worked 
for scale. "It was just a thrill and an education to work for them, " he said 
of the producers Joel and Ethan Coen. "That's why it's so fortunate we 
have a union. Actors would work for free." (Whitaker) 
But if left to the bottom line, the livelihood of acting seems destined to return to the 
uncertain state of pre-unionized conditions. The evidence is in the growing use of non- 
equity performers on the road and the increasing transfer of movie production "off shore" 
(McKinley 2001). Left to the bottom line, audiences will certainly have bigger and 
brighter entertainments to anticipate, but the opportunity to experience another 
generation's Shakespeare, Moliere, or Sophocles will become even less frequent than 
history might predict. If left to the bottom line, and actors become just another special 
effect, it will matter little if the star of any show is human or not. 
Chapter 2 
HISTORY PLAYS: THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF ACTORS' LABOR 
Perhaps the most intriguing question to consider regarding the industrial 
organization of the performing arts is how andlor why have the creative talents 
themselves become so complicit in their own exploitation? Is it extreme to attribute some 
of the cause to the performers (among other artists) and their unions when the inequity of 
the "star system" would appear to be so apparent? Why haven't performers' unions done 
more to secure employment stability for their members? A look at the history of labor 
organization in the performing arts reveals that, more often than not, the producers' 
associations were able to successfully play one segment of the industry's labor force 
against another. Producers thus achieved, at the lowest possible cost, most of their goals 
while relinquishing little of their control. Given the dificult battles to establish union 
representation, it is perhaps not so surprising that labor solidarity among actors has 
always been a tenuous concept 
When the historical trend of labor organization widened to include actors and 
other workers in the performing arts at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
industry itself was undergoing radical shifts in its structure. The producers' syndicates 
struggled among themselves for industry-wide domination, and technologies emerged to 
create entirely new cinematic and broadcast mediums. The abuse of labor by increasingly 
powerful business combinations gave rise to the first collective bargaining organizations 
that represented actors, and these eventually led to the creation of the Actors' Equity 
Association, or Equity. The industry's technological innovation and expansion increased 
both opportunities for and abuses of actors, and subsequently, the motion picture segment 
of the performing arts industry would also be success~lly unionized, as would, 
eventually, the even newer media of radio and television. The Screen Actors' Guild, 
SAG, and the American Federation of Radio and Television Artists, or AFTRA, would 
eventually represent the performers in these media and, along with Equity, bargain for the 
collective interests of nearly one-third of all actors of every kind and nearly all actors of 
the professional kind in the United States (SAG 1). Winning the Basic Agreement and 
Standard Minimum Contract in 1919 (Harding 281) made Equity the undisputed 
bargaining agent for stage actors and became the model which SAG (Ross 25) and 
AFTRA (Harvey 20) built upon when organizing film, radio and television actors. Even 
though collective bargaining has accomplished much to increase compensation for actors 
and to improve physical conditions of their work, the unions have been mostly silent 
regarding job security issues (Harvey 10). The performers' unions seek to improve the 
"standard minimum contract," and to widen its application. They continue to fight on the 
edges of the economic structures that relegate most of their membership to a lifetime of 
professional under-employment. 
Acting in a Commoditv Market: Stars and Widgets 
As the twentieth century progressed, the producers' syndicates and the studio 
system gave w ay to  more independent p roduction o rganizations. The number o f p lays 
and motion pictures produced each year declined, and the number of actors seeking 
employment increased (Cantor 210). Today, the "star system" continues to drive the 
industry, hlfilling the audience's desire for celebrities and the producers' need for 
powerful marketing tools. I t  also provides success~l  actors with wealth and fame and 
journeyman performers with hope (Cantor 214). Meanwhile, non-union theatrical 
productions, particularly on the road (Souccar I), and "off-shore" movie productions are 
becoming more common as producers seek to cut costs, maximize profits, and undercut 
union employment and solidarity (Vogel 75). Advances in computer technology are now 
gaining, as mentioned previously, serious consideration for Best Performance Oscars for 
digitally realized characters. Employment security in the performing arts may be more 
tenuous than ever. 
Typically, technological developments enhance producers' ability to market 
repeatedly an individual's performance. These issues are usually resolved by expanding 
the application of previous contracts, as performers seek to match their residual income to 
the potential number of marketed performances. But labor issues that arise from 
technological innovation often have both economic and cultural consequence. They affect 
both the process of creating and marketing performances and the relationship between 
performer and audience. For instance, improvements in transportation dispersed the 
American population in the middle part of the nineteenth century and increased 
opportunities for regional performers. Subsequent development of road production 
companies then eliminated most of those employment opportunities. Also, the 
development of the motion picture industry, while contracting performance opportunities 
even further, simultaneously created a mass audience for mass marketed performances. 
This fundamentally changed the way audiences and actors relate to performances: 
audiences were no longer necessary co-participants but simply consumers, and the 
fragmentary, non-linear mode of movie production became piecework as much as 
performance. 
The cultural relationship that presupposed communication through dramatic art 
and was supported by the commercial activity of production had been the foundation of 
the actorlaudience relationship since the Renaissance. After the industrial revolution, the 
balance shifted largely towards the commercial, and employment opportunities for 
performers began to contract. Eventually, the perennial problem of performer 
underemployment reached crisis when the Great Depression led to a decline in play and 
movie production. This decline was followed by the demise of the studio system in the 
wake of the Federal anti-trust action depriving the studios of the legal right to own their 
exhibition venues after World War I1 (Caves 94). These declines were not offset by 
population growth or the advent of the regional theatre movement. On the contrary, 
underemployment that followed these declines was exacerbated M h e r  by the growth of 
educational opportunities after World War 11. That growth eventually led to an explosion 
of actor training programs intended to meet the needs of the regional theatres (Schechner 
15). The postwar era was also marked by growth in the broadcast media as well as the 
development of cable and satellite distribution networks. These new outlets together 
however, have not been able to absorb the growth in the talent pool. The supply of 
performers seemingly has no limit. It is an employer's market, and union organization 
has historically been labor's only means of enhancing its bargaining power. 
Severe anti-union pressure persists, however, in the growth of both off-shore 
movie-making and non-union theatrical productions (primarily tours), and by the studio- 
distributors' growing investment in both the technological and legal supports for internet- 
distributed performances (Graves 4-6). If the performers' unions wish to remain viable in 
the future, they may need to re-evaluate their position regarding underemployment as a 
casting issue righthlly determined by producers (Prindle 11). The perfonners, through 
their unions, might better serve themselves if they seek to re-examine the entire gamut of 
industrial relations i n the p erforrning arts. Labor s olidarity, s o d ifficult t o a chieve and 
tenuous t o  hold, m ight be the m ost i mportant 1 ocus o f i ndustrial relations t o  evaluate. 
Indeed, as SAG president Melissa Gilbert states in her monthly message to the union's 
membership: 
During the last twelve months, I have [. . .] seen a substantial 
increase in the consolidation and evolution to digital technology that have 
marked our industry for the last several years. Our employers are 
becoming ever more powefil. As both AFTRA and SAG spend valuable 
resources to maintain or expand their jurisdictions, I have seen employers 
play the unions against each other, driving our wages ever lower. 
I have concluded, as have many others who have witnessed these 
changes, that the entertainment unions cannot afford to continue 
contesting with one another. Our health and pension funds have suffered, 
eligibility has become harder to achieve for many, and benefits are 
decreasing. Divided bargaining power has marginalized our leverage in 
contract negotiations. The end result has been less money in members' 
pockets. 
The status quo may seem comfortable and safe, but it is the most 
dangerous place of all given the conditions in this industry. If we do not 
act [to consolidate organizational efforts], we must be left behind by a 
business that is relentlessly moving forward. (Gilbert 1) 
It is encouraging that the performers' unions still strive to overcome the divisions of the 
past. But to focus on the current forward-looking efforts to forge solidarity among the 
performers' unions here, however, would be to minimize the historical and defining 
competition between two very different ideologies of unionism, i.e., organization along 
craft versus industrial lines. Exemplified by the American Federation of Labor on the one 
hand and by the Congress of Industrial Organizations on the other well, this divide was 
not necessarily bridged by their eventual combination into the AFLCIO. It may be that 
ending the competitive pressure to better represent labor's interests contributed more to 
the rise of business unionism over progressive social unionism. Accommodation with 
rather than the restructuring of the present system of industrial relations has been the rule 
since these organizations combined. Even so, several questions remain. How adversarial 
is the relationship between producers and creative laborers and how deep is the divide 
between the various performers' unions? Why is there such disharmony, even distrust, 
between the actors' unions, which should logically share common interests? And how did 
the situation arise? To understand why Ms. Gilbert portrays these inter-union 
relationships as historically discouraging and producer-performer relations as eternally 
antagonistic, it is helpfil to understand the events of the past. 
When Actors Managed: 
The Ori~ins of Mass Production and Markets in the Performing Arts 
Before the nineteenth century, plays were produced in the United States mostly 
along the eastern seaboard, but as the country expanded west, so did the performing arts. 
By the 1830's, actors, primarily foreign stars, had performed as far west as New Orleans; 
by the 1840's' there had been notable performances in St. Louis; by the 1850's, 
improvements in transportation and the discovery of gold in California pulled Americans 
and actors all the way to the Pacific coast (Bricker 104-105). Prior to this expansion, the 
American theatre had begun evolving from "cooperative repertory organizations" of 
actors into managed companies of salaried performers (Bricker 102-3). By the time 
western expansion was in full swing, it had become customary for "star" performers to 
travel alone and perform with the salaried actors hired by resident stock companies in 
each of the cities on the tour itinerary (Bricker 106). The "star system" clearly evolved 
step by step with the American theatre. 
Financially, rewards of presenting popular stars were offset by the higher cost of 
hiring them, and the managers adjusted by lowering the salaries of the members of the 
resident companies. This drove some talents from the field and lowered the quality of 
performance as well (Bricker 107). By the middle decades of the nineteenth century it 
became apparent that the quality of the remaining players in many of the frontier stock 
companies was no longer high enough to meet either the audiences' or the touring stars' 
expectations. Even so, neither managers nor stars possessed enough "selfless intelligence 
in the welfare of local [performers]" to seek the situation's improvement through 
improving the training and/or compensation of the local performer. Instead, the touring 
stars first hired small numbers of supporting players (whose numbers were supplemented 
by the few remaining local artists) then very quickly began creating full-fledged touring 
stock companies to support their performances (Bricker 108). As American 
industrialization progressed, this system of "traveling combination [companies]" led to 
the consolidation of the performing arts industry along industrial business models, 
incurring many of the abuses associated with that process such as low wages, capricious 
treatment of individual performers by producers, precipitous layoffs and show closings, 
and other forms of capitalist or producer-ordered contracting. Eventually, those abuses 
led, as they had in other industries, to the organization of theatre worker's unions, but it 
wasn't until the producers' power consolidated that the endemic abuses become acutely 
unbearable. 
As these more or less self-contained production companies became dominant in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, the owners of theatre facilities across the 
country ceased being theatre managers and became theatre landlords instead (Bricker 
109). 0 ften, traveling c ompanies w ould c ancel one e ngagernent at the 1 ast m oment to  
pursue another, seeking the most profitable opportunity. Theatre operators responded by 
double booking their facilities to insure occupancy (Bricker 1 12-1 13). Gradually, to 
eliminate confusion created by such unreliable behavior, theatre producers began to 
organize b ooking o ffices, t o b etter c ontrol the o fferings i n their v enues ( Bricker 1 14). 
Finally, in 1896, a trust known as the Theatrical Syndicate was formed through 
combining three existing partnerships: Klaw and Erlanger in the South, Nixon and 
Zimmerman in Philadelphia and the Midwest, and Hayrnan and Frohman west of the 
Mississippi. It was formed explicitly to control "the legitimate theatre of the entire 
country through the control of its bookings" (Bricker 114). 
At its height, the Syndicate controlled over seven hundred theatres, and though 
this was by no means every theatre in the country, it did represent the very best. 
Consequently, every production that hoped to play the best houses and every house that 
hoped to present the best productions had to make arrangements with the Syndicate to do 
so (Bricker 115). This system did improve the eficiency of matching productions and 
theatres, but it primarily served the interests of the three combined partnerships through a 
fee structure that ranged as high as one-half of net profits, often on top of other fees, or 
"tribute," charged to producers, writers and stars merely for the privilege of doing 
business (Bricker 1 16). 
The Rule of the Syndicates: Market Consolidation 
The first organized opposition to the Syndicates' self-serving production system 
was from a group called the Actors' Society of America, formed a scant three months 
before the Syndicate to "discriminate between responsible and irresponsible managers 
and to assist its members in securing contracts with responsible managers only" (Harding 
10). Unfortunately, its efforts to secure better treatment for performers were largely and 
successfully ignored and it wasn't until a group of actor-managers began to feel the 
pressure of unfair competition that any real resistance was presented to the Syndicate. 
Since this opposition was focused on the uneven distribution of power over theatrical 
bookings, it was easy for the Syndicate to simply offer better deals to individual actor- 
managers and fracture their alliance. At no time did either these actor-managers or the 
Actors' Society seek to coordinate their efforts against the Syndicate (Harding 10-1 1). 
In 1902, another coalition of actor-managers called the Independent Booking 
Office, in concert with an independent chain of popularly priced theatres, challenged the 
increasingly powefil Syndicate. By the beginning of the 1904-1905 season, the owners 
of these theatres, Stair and Havlin, were simply bought off with offers of more venues in 
their popular market (Bricker 117). Though the actors never successfully challenged the 
monopoly power of the Syndicate, another group of theatre managers did. 
Sam Shubert, along with hls brothers Lee and J.J., began with a small circuit of 
theatres in upstate New York and purchased their first New York City venue in 1900. By 
1905 they were building new and better-equipped houses across the country and luring 
star performers to perform exclusively in them. This competition did not go unnoticed, 
and the Syndicate attempted to limit those actors' professional opportunities by locking 
them o ut o f t he t heatres under S yndicate c ontrol. T he S huberts responded b y b uilding 
more state of the art theatres and successfully increased the number of performers willing 
to stand with them against the Syndicate. The main allies in the Shuberts' fight, however, 
were not actors, but financiers. By persuading the banking community that reliable profit 
potential did in fact exist in the "gamble" of the theatre, the Shuberts were able to build 
their circuit fiom the ground up (Bricker 1 18-1 2 1). 
By 1916, the Shuberts had successfully achieved dominance among American 
theatrical producers and bookers (Bricker 126), completing the process that effectively 
divorced actors fiom theatre management. From Colonial times to the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, senior actors had assumed the business responsibility in a craft-like 
industry marked by close personal relationships between all members of any given acting 
company (Harding 5). Now, the performing arts were thoroughly organized along 
capitalistic and industrial lines with financiers and businessmen at the top of the pyramid 
and with all others, including actors, at the bottom. And it was, indeed, the bottom. The 
Actor's Society had chosen to remain on the sidelines during the clash between the 
Shuberts and the Syndicate, and failed in several attempts to enter the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL). By the end of 1912, it decided to end its existence as a social 
and business organization, establishing instead a committee to explore the formation of 
an actors' organization that focused solely on economic grievances (Harding 12). 
These grievances were many. Contracts between performers and presenters were 
drawn entirely by the theatre owners andlor producers. Actors without clout could take or 
leave them. There was no limit to rehearsal time, and rehearsal time was unpaid. Actors 
were known to rehearse for months then suddenly find themselves unemployed when the 
production closed after one or two performances. If the production continued to run, 
management was allowed to adjust salaries downward to protect profits. The traditional 
two weeks notice to actors of the impending close of a production was largely 
abandoned. Actors were required to pay their own transportation costs from the point of 
organization to the point of opening and from the point of closing home. Stranding of 
performers at points between was common. Performers provided their own costumes. 
The "satisfaction clause" allowed managers to terminate any contract simply by declaring 
the performer's work unsatisfactory without regard for positive press notices. It was 
simply a business device that allowed managers to control costs. Though many of these 
abuses were challenged in court, many like the "satisfaction clause" were held to be 
entirely legal, and when judgments were rendered in favor of the performers, corporation 
laws effectively shielded the wealth of the managers. The lack of collective bargaining 
power placed actors behind other unionized creditors such as musicians and stagehands 
(Harding 7- 10). 
The Actors Respond: Union Organization 
As hard as it might be to find stability in professional relationships set under a 
one-sided interpretation of the "satisfaction clause," the fact that the industry itself was 
undergoing profound shifts only made matters worse. The number of road companies 
began a slow contraction, falling fiom three hundred and thirty-seven in 1908 to twenty- 
seven by 1934. Production costs rose as many of the crafts associated with theatrical 
production were unionized. Materials for technical production and transportation were 
becoming more expensive as well. Also, audiences were declining. Managers would 
sometimes promote productions with recognizable stars only to present other, inferior 
productions to the advance ticket holders. Vaudeville was becoming a more family 
oriented popular entertainment and, at far lower prices, successfully lured many away 
fiom the legitimate theatre audience. Vaudeville promoters began to purchase the 
increasingly idle theatre venues. And though its effect would not be fully felt until 
decades later, the nascent motion picture industry began presenting shorts in the 
vaudeville houses. In 1901, managers used these short films to fully substitute for live 
performers during a strike by the White Rats, the vaudevillians' union. By 1905, feature 
length motion pictures were being shown in theatres opened expressly for that use 
(Bricker 126-132). By the time the Actors' Society was giving way to the organizational 
committee of the Actors' Equity Association in May 1913 (Harding 13), the motion 
picture industry was already shifting to the west coast, to Hollywood and away fiom the 
more unionized east (Ross 6). 
Actors, at least according to the New York Review, the public voice of the 
Shuberts, faced great obstacles to unionization in their very natures: "The minute one of 
them found a backer and had a chance to go starring the adopted form of contract would 
be consigned to limbo" (Harding 16). Actors themselves had reason to share such 
opinion. Little more than a decade had passed since the Syndicate had successfully 
employed the tactics of division to conquer the opposition the actor managers had 
presented them at the turn of the century. Long accustomed to working together, at least 
when it was profitable to do so, producing managers, including the Shuberts, were now 
organized in either the National Association of Theatrical Producing Managers (NATPM) 
or, with theatre owners and bookers like Klaw and Erlanger, in the United Managers' 
Protective Association (UMPA) (Harding 19). These organizations expected that history, 
given time and encouragement, would simply repeat itself. 
When Equity approached NATPM in November 1913 to begin negotiations 
towards an industry-wide standard contract, the producers took this as an opportunity to 
stall the issue until Equity's inevitable self-destruction would occur. After six months of 
unfruithl meetings, Equity opened discussions with UMPA to similar results. By the fall 
of 19 14, discussions were so mired that managers suggested the union drop the campaign 
for an industry-wide agreement and simply make suggestions that they "feel to be 
necessary for an equitable arrangement" (Harding 21). Concurrent with these hit less 
negotiations, theatre business practices continued as usual, at the whim of management. 
Individual performers would take their grievances to the law courts, with mixed results, 
but in June 191 5 Equity won a legal judgment that actors were "wage earners under the 
industrial laws of New York, and were to be considered preferred creditors" of bankrupt 
producing companies (Harding 24). This decision did provide actors a better position to 
demand at least some of their contracted compensation fiom failing companies but did 
nothing to prod the contract negotiations forward. 
Equity had recognized since its inception that the key to the "strength of the 
mechanical Associations [i.e., stage-hands, etc.,] lies in the fact that their members will 
not work with non-union men and if their members are idle because of their refusal to so 
work t heir w ages a re p aid" ( Harding 2 5). B y 1 9 15 the E quity 1 eadership realized that 
convincing management of the justness of their position through discussion was 
insufficient, and that making Equity a third party in the Standard Contract was essential. 
Though membership was open to anyone who could prove three years' employment as an 
actor (Harding 18), Equity now determined to make every theatre an Equity shop 
(Harding 25). This endeavor would not likely be received, as the contract issue had, with 
the managers' relatively benign willingness to negotiate. It would be a fight. To enlist the 
support of the growing and dispersed rank and file membership, Equity's leadership 
needed an official voice. To give its negotiating positions more clout, they needed 
support fiom other, larger labor organizations. In December 1915, Equity Magazine 
appeared and a delegation to the American Federation of Labor was soon dispatched 
(Harding 26-27). 
Strike and Settlement: The Basic Agreement and Standard Minimum Contract 
What followed was exemplary of the divisions that can arise in a single 
organization, or between organizations that share common goals. Also exemplified are 
the several ways opposing organizations can use such splits t o  their advantage. These 
dynamics found expression at the national level in the competition between craft and 
industrial oriented labor unionists. Craft unionists (led by the American Federation of 
Labor, or AFL) strive to organize skilled workers along narrow lines of each individual 
craft o r  j ob. Industrial unionists ( first 1 ed b y the Industrial Workers o f t he World and 
ultimately by the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or CIO) seek to organize workers 
in entire industries regardless of skill level or job. Though the AFL had included some 
industrial unions for many years, the economic boom of the 1920's created more jobs in 
mass production than in individual crafts. The labor unrest spurred by the Depression of 
the 1930's encouraged some in the AFL to reexamine their aversion to organizing 
unskilled labor. The CIO originated as a committee within the AFL in 1935, but 
disagreements between the two core constituencies, craft and industrial unionists, were 
not overcome, and they split acrimoniously in 1938. These two giant labor organizations 
continued to be plagued by these divisions, often working at cross-purposes until they 
finally merged as the AFL-CIO in 1955 (Davey 20-3 1). 
This macrocosmic wrangling over who was to represent whose interests was 
duplicated at the microcosmic level as well. When Equity approached the AFL in early 
1916, they discovered the federation had already granted a charter covering the 
amusement field to the White Rats Actors' Union of America. The AFL fiowned upon 
duplication of union representation, and encouraged Equity join this existing union. The 
White Rats at that time were in a bitter struggle with the Vaudeville Managers' Protective 
Association. Locked o ut b y the m anagers who had o rganized a "company union," the 
National Vaudeville Artists, Inc., they sought to protect their affiliation with the AFL, 
and effectively blocked Equity's attempts to obtain the AFL charter governing the theatre 
industry. Though this standoff between these two unions was to last for several years, the 
mere possibility of Equity securing the support of the AFL convinced United Managers' 
Protective Association (UMPA) to agree to a Standard Contract in 191 7 (Harding 27-38). 
Unfortunately, the agreement proved meaningless. Managers simply refused to 
issue the standard contract and UMPA was unable to force its adoption. Within weeks of 
signing the agreement with Equity, UMPA had effectively dissolved as a representative 
trade organization when the Shuberts and Klaw and Erlanger returned to the active 
pursuit of their rivalry (Harding 41). 
With the support of organized labor still entangled with the fate of the White Rats, 
Equity now began to seek pledges from its membership to accept "only the Standard 
U.M.P.A.-A.E.A. contracts intact" (Harding 45). Equity also created an entry level, non- 
voting membership class to prevent the managers hiring all-amateur casts as 
strikebreakers. Equity's membership was now near 3,000 strong, representing between 
forty and fifty percent of the performers in the legitimate theatre. Equity was preparing its 
membership to vote for a closed shop (Harding 52-53). Equity was also continuing its 
negotiations with the White Rats and the AFL. Negotiations finally yielded the h i t  of 
the four A's, the Associated Actors' and Artistes of America, a new union that would 
hold the charter to be relinquished by the vaudevillians. Each performers' union would be 
encompassed within it and represented proportionally on its governing board. This 
arrangement insured Equity a dominant position in the new union (Harding 66). 
Equity's efforts to strengthen its position were not lost on the managers. UMPA 
had been rendered useless by internal strife and a new organization, the Producing 
Managers' Association (PMA), was formed in 1919. Though it contained many of the 
same players, its new focus solely upon the interests of producers gave it enough 
cohesion to effectively oppose Equity (Harding 54). The PMA offered its own contract 
to the actors, identical in almost all respects save it refused to recognize the Association 
as a party to any contract between management and performer (Harding 67). It imposed a 
bond of $10,000 on every manager not to issue any Equity contracts (Harding 63). It 
followed the lead of the Vaudeville managers and determined to offer individual actors 
lucrative contracts for renouncing Equity and accepting membership in a company union 
to be organized by PMA. Finally, the PMA sought to lock out Equity by affiliating with 
producers of every kind of performance, including motion pictures, and refusing to even 
speak to the union's representatives (Harding 76). Equity had no choice but to declare a 
strike barring its members fiom performing "any service for any manager who is a 
member of the Producing Managers' Association" (Harding 80). 
On August 7, 1919, the actors in thirteen productions walked out. Aided by 
supporting walkouts by the stagehands' and musicians' unions, as well as refusals by 
teamsters and other workers to contribute labor to productions labeled unfair, Equity 
prevailed. Equity had won the Basic Agreement and Standard Contract it had been 
striving for since 1913. The strike "lasted thirty days, spread to eight cities, closed thirty- 
seven plays, and prevented the opening of sixteen others, and cost everybody concerned 
in the neighborhood of three million dollars" (Bricker 136). 
The fight was not, however, over. Managers began luring actors away fiom 
Equity by offering non-Equity performers contract terms superior to the Standard 
Contract. Equity finally declared a c losed shop prior t o  the 1 92 1-1922 season and the 
managers challenged the practice before a federal judge. The arbitration judgment handed 
down on August 17, 1921 affirmed Equity's right to a closed shop both contractually and 
legally. By the time the Basic Agreement was due for renewal in 1924, the PMA, 
including the Shuberts, had agreed to continue the agreement (Bricker 136-138). 
Equity's struggle proved to be the archetype for the unionization of performers in 
the other media as well. The unionization of Hollywood was initiated by the efforts of the 
AFL to organize the production crafts in 1916, prompting the formation of the Motion 
Picture Producers' Association (MMPA) in response (Ross 6). What followed was a 
replay of the infighting amongst several performers' unions, the consolidation of 
producers' organizations, and the usual business tactics of coercion and co-option. The 
issue of representation was temporarily settled in 1927 when the producers, now 
organized in the Association of Motion Picture Producers (AMPP), created the Academy 
of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences. This unique body was created to insure labor 
harmony on an industry-wide basis, though it came to function more like a "company 
union" than a workers bargaining organization (Ross 21-41). 
The motion picture industry is based upon the repeated marketing of single 
performances. With the resulting economies of scale, movie performances earn far 
greater profits than can legitimate theatrical productions, which incur new costs with each 
repetition. By paying higher salaries than legitimate theatre producers could afford, 
movie producers used these higher profits to temporarily purchase labor peace. Movie 
actors may have rebuffed early attempts at organization, but the conflicting interests of 
performers and producers inevitably forced real collective bargaining arrangements into 
being. While industry wealth, along with the Academy, allowed the producers to forestall 
performers' real efforts to bargain collectively, the economic collapse of the Great 
Depression prompted producers to announce industry-wide pay cuts of fifty percent. This 
announcement in 1933 provided actors the impetus to form the Screen Actors' Guild 
(Prindle 17). 
SAG won its battle for a Basic Agreement and closed shop in 1937 after a long 
process of building solidarity among widely divergent individual performers (Ross 162). 
These agreements were forced upon producers only when performers achieved near total 
solidarity within their ranks. By realizing the common interest shared by extra and star, 
SAG, like Equity, managed to secure the basis for wage and workplace justice. This 
effort to meet the needs of lowly paid extras in the same basic contract that applies to 
highly paid stars represents the most valuable guide for addressing the continuing under- 
employment of actors. The old theatre adage that "there are no small parts" carries even 
greater weight in an age when technical innovation suggests there may be little need for 
any parts at all. 
Who's Left Out: What the Basic A~reement Doesn't Guarantee 
The B asic A greements and S tandard Minimum Contracts that E quity and S AG 
achieved raised the economic status of working performers to a level shared by the 
American middle class, but did not address the issue of job security in the work place. 
Many unions have sought to insure stable employment through seniority and other rules, 
but the Standard Minimum Contracts did not address the opportunity to work. The 
agreements acknowledged that actor-managers had lost control of the industry to 
businessmen. In return, the businessmen acknowledged the unionized actors' right to 
negotiate minimum compensation and workplace standards for those members fortunate 
enough to be employed. The entertainment industry's management saw that trading a 
modicum of decision-making power for guaranteed periods of labor stability made some 
investment decisions less risky than before and encouraged union leadership to organize 
in a parallel fashion to the corporate industries with which they negotiate. SAG and 
Equity became what are called business unions, "organized on craft lines and run on the 
strict idea of protection of the members of a particular craft [and] . . . concerned with the 
day-to-day problems on the job, pay scales and working conditions" (Nielson ix). 
Business unions leave the determination of who should work and how often to 
management. Consequently, "union management attempts to channel workers' demands 
into economic contract issues concerning wages and benefits" runs counter to the larger 
interests of the "rank-and-file, [who], by virtue of their daily involvement in the labor 
process, tend to advance more political demands which directly affect work conditions," 
in particular (Jeter 81-82). In fact, business unionism tends to develop institutional self- 
interest that can occasionally take precedence over the needs of the membership, in 
particular, the casual nature of entertainment industry employment. "By contrast, 'social 
unionists' had a broader social goal in mind; they felt the need of basic changes in the 
entire social system" (Nielson ix). Rather than simply negotiating for a larger slice of pie 
from management, social unionists strive to balance the power that economic 
concentration gives management. Social unionists question the practicality of shaking a 
hand that i s always p repared t o w ithdraw; t hey refuse t o  a ssume m anagement's rights 
over an individual's ability to earn a livelihood. All the benefits offered by the Basic 
Agreement come to naught if the required minimum number of qualifying weeks is 
beyond the majority of working members' expectations of annual employment. And now, 
despite the value and viability of the Basic Agreements and Standard Minimum Contracts 
to the fortunate few who manage to eke out a living as performers, recent changes in the 
industry are undermining the health of the performers' unions and raising doubts about 
the industry's commitment to honoring these hard won gains. 
In every challenging time, it may be worthwhile to reconsider alternatives, or 
better, recall our own history. There was a time when live American actors and audiences 
met in large numbers to mutually consider their lives and times. It occurred, in fact, just 
as actors in Hollywood were approaching the victory of the SAG closed shop and basic 
agreement. The Federal Government had addressed the calamity of the Great Depression 
through the agency of the newly created Works Progress Administration and, as a result, 
brought about the greatest production experiment in American theatre history. It began 
when society, through the Federal government, attempted the re-employment of tens of 
thousands of idled theatre artists in the Federal Theatre Project. And its effects were to be 
far more reaching than anyone had imagined. 
Chapter 3 
WHEN THE FAT LADY SANG: THE FEDERAL THEATRE PROJECT 
Historical and economic analysis offers more than theory; they are among the 
basic tools by which we organize our thinking about society. In the 1930's, the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA) was a practical response to the crisis of the Great 
Depression. Using the tools of Keynesian macroeconomics to address cyclic financial 
phenomena, the federal government engaged in social projects encompassing both huge 
infrastructure developments and individual employment. And though the moment when 
such governmental activity is apparently long past, the Federal Theatre Project, a WPA 
relief effort that employed the idle and fed the hungry, may yet be a model for providing 
sustenance for the spirit. That is the hope that lives at the heart of this paper. The 
"message of history is that only a participatory democracy can challenge a predatory 
plutocracy" (Newfield 17); the performing arts industry is, if not dominated by, then at 
least driven by a handful of multi-national conglomerates predatory for profit. The 
practical response to this crisis is revealed in the grass-roots structure of the largest single 
theatrical endeavor ever undertaken in the United States: the Federal Theatre Project. 
The Federal Response to Economic Calamity 
Writing in his contemporaneous account of the Federal Theatre Project, Bread 
and Circuses, Willson Whitman is quite clear about the humanitarian, not aesthetic, 
intentions that brought the project into being: 
The Federal Theatre was not founded because the government felt that the 
time had come to start a national theatre, to provide cultural opportunities 
for p eople unable t o a fford a T heatre Guild s ubscription, o r t o s et up a 
yardstick for commercial entertainment. It owes its existence to the 
assumption that actors must eat. (9) 
In her book about the American worker's theatre and labor movements, Staging 
Strikes, C olette H yman found i t i ronic t hat w hile the " FTP . . . was i ntended first and 
foremost to put Americans back to work. . . .Participants in workers' theatre groups in the 
early 1930's point to the FTP as responsible, in part, for the decline of their movement" 
(127). Though these small theatres could not compete with the government subsidy 
enjoyed by the FTP, the artists and workers attached to them found the steady 
employment opportunities afforded by the project welcome. Using techniques employed 
earlier b y the w orkers' theatre m ovement, t hese artists' c ontributions t o several o f t he 
Federal Theatre's separate units, particularly the One-Act Play Unit and the Living 
Newspaper, transformed their steady employment with the Federal Theatre into a social 
aesthetic that drew 1 arger audiences and m ore p ositive c ritical acclaim than m any h ad 
thought possible (1 27-8). 
The audience development and aesthetic exploration that the workers' theatres 
had begun in the first decades of the twentieth century was continued and further 
developed by the FTP to a degree that both surprised and emboldened theatre artists 
during the catastrophe of the Great Depression. Speaking to the staff of One Third of a 
Nation, the most renowned of all the Living Newspapers, the Federal Theatre Project's 
National Director, Hallie Flanagan "emphasized the potency of theatre and of the FTP in 
particular: 'By a stroke unprecedented in dramatic history, we have been given a chance 
to help change America at a time when twenty million unemployed Americans proved it 
needed changing. And the theatre, when it is any good, can change things"' (128). That 
the chronic under-employment of theatre artists numbers less than twenty million today 
is not a rationale for continuing business as usual. Nor is the fact that the Federal Theatre 
was precipitously closed when Congress cut off the Project's funding in 1937. Rather, the 
dire situation of today's theatre artists demands we revisit the legacy of America's 
greatest theatrical experiment and reconsider the means by which such a theatre of artists 
might again perform. 
In her memoir of the Federal Theatre Project, Arena, Flanagan points out that the 
theatre profession had endured the ravages of a technologically induced economic 
depression for decades prior to the Crash of 1929 (13). Still, the effect of the Great 
Depression upon Broadway, the nexus of the American theatre, was devastating. Citing a 
report fiom the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Flanagan writes "in 1932, 
more than 22,000 actors registered with the casting bureaus at Hollywood," many for the 
first time after relocating fiom the east (14); by "one estimate 40,000 show folk were 
destitute during the depression. That is too many," according to Whitman, "but divided 
by half it's still impressive" (10). The economic catastrophe of the 1930's created a 
social and political climate unlike that of any era before or since, begetting some 
institutions such as Social Security that persist today. Others, like the Works Progress 
Administration and the Federal Theatre, were rather short-lived. The Federal Theatre was 
made politically possible by economic depression even as the movies' technological 
innovation and industrial organization was already adversely affecting the structural 
economics of the acting profession. Then as now, the impact of industrialization is harsh 
and few actors are able t o  make a living through the sole practice of their profession. 
Many of the reasons that justified the creation of the Federal Theatre Project remain. 
Gainful employment, health care and retirement are still hit or miss propositions for the 
majority of performers. The Federal Theatre was eventually made politically impossible 
by ideological conditions and arguments that, at bottom, are matters of economic 
distribution, fairness and justice. And though the Ice Capades will probably play in Hades 
before Congress reconsiders fimding the Federal Theatre, the value of the model remains. 
For the performers and their families, the Project's social benefits far surpassed their cost: 
As a work p roject, the Federal T heatre w as u ndeniably more e xpensive 
than direct relief; as a professional project, it was also more expensive 
than other work programs. For example, the WPA paid $1,250 to support 
a Federal Theatre employee for an entire year; $732 to support a 
construction worker-a further supplement was paid to the latter by the 
local sponsoring agency . . . Throughout its four-year history, the Project 
had employed an average of ten thousand workers yearly, each of whom 
supported an average of four dependents at a total cost of $46 million. 
(Mathews 304) 
Ten thousand theatre workers in 1939 represented perhaps a fifth of the combined 
pre-Depression Actor's Equity Association, Screen Actors' Guild, the 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers memberships. The technicians' labor market is far 
more stable than that of the creative professions and, in 1929, the two sectors, 
technicians and performers, had roughly equal memberships. Today, the combined 
labor force in Hollywood and the professional theatre is probably closer to 500,000 
workers; to support a fifth of that number, 100,000, with an annual salary of $75,000 
would require a subsidy of $7.5 billion. Such a subsidy would represent roughly four 
percent of the entertainment industry's $180 billion annual gross income. Such a 
workforce is roughly two and a half times larger than that employed by the 262 theatres 
responding to the Theatre Communications Group's annual survey, Theatre Facts 2000 
(TCG 2). 
Though these survey theatres are not by any means all the live theatre companies 
in the United States, they represent the bulk of organizations with annual budgets over 
$250,000.00. And though the year 2000 survey is not the most recent, it was chosen to 
reflect the condition of the live theatre segment of the performing arts industry during the 
most recent era of prosperity. What is most interesting here is that a two point profit 
participation on the industry's total revenues could duplicate the entire not-for-profit 
sector. Or possibly even more. During the 1930's, the administrative overhead of the 
Federal Theatre Project was limited by WPA mandate to 10% of the overall budget rather 
than the Survey theatre's 16% average. Production planning was also organized from the 
grass roots up, utilizing civic facilities for rehearsal and performing venues whenever 
possible. First and foremost, the goal was the employment of idled artists. If such 
financial participation as described above were to be configured along similar lines the 
impact would likely be significantly larger. 
The Real Issue: Distribution of Wealth 
All discussion of the distribution of the wealth created from the union of capital 
and labor is both ideological and political. From the beginning, the WPA and its 
programs were based upon the ideology of economic justice and were beset by an 
opposing ideology favoring capital and enterprise. The whole of American society was 
caught in the upheaval of the Great Depression and the WPA was engaged in constant 
political battles for operational funding and ultimately, survival. Arguments regarding 
social needs and public relief fueled the strife of that era, and the same ideological and 
partisan political battles play a continuing role in this nation's efforts to simultaneously 
achieve economic prosperity and social justice. 
Given the persistence and virulence of this debate, it might now seem inevitable 
that under the scrutiny of the anti-Communist investigations of the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities the Federal Theatre would eventually be sacrificed on the altar of 
political ambition (Mathews 198-99). And though it may be laughable today that when 
questioning Hallie Flanagan, Congressman Joseph Starnes asked, with a straight face and 
more than once, "Who is this Marlowe [Christopher Marlowe, 16" century English 
playwright] . . . Is he a communist?"' (220), it must be recognized that repeating the 
canard of the Communist threat for political advantage has done much to limit the depth 
and breadth of the economic debate in America. It remains useful, however, to remember 
what, beyond simple charitable relief, the Federal Theatre Project's founders, if not its 
governmental sponsors, had hoped to achieve. 
Though the WPA sought to provide work so that people could live, that is not the 
same as saying people should live only to work. Elmer Rice, the first director of the New 
York unit of the Federal Theatre recognized that perhaps only: 
Incorrigible optimists [. . .] believe that, given an enlightened 
administration and a sufficient amount of influential pressure, both from 
theatre workers and theatergoers, it might be possible to devise a plan that 
would provide governmental support for the theatre and at the same time 
keep political interference at a minimum. Admittedly it is a faint hope; but 
it w ill p ersist as  1 ong as there are p eople who c herish the theatre a s an  
instrument of enlightenment and for emotional and spiritual satisfaction. 
(Rice 160) 
The hope that theatre will remain "an instrument of enlightenment" is threatened by more 
than the government's failure to fiscally support it; it is equally threatened by society's 
failure to redress the imbalance of power between capital and labor, itself a political 
condition. It may shrivel or thrive by artists' choices to address this imbalance or ignore 
it. Enlightenment is more than finding answers; it is equally a process of posing 
questions. Enlightenment is a process of discovery that is unpredictable, which explains, 
in large part, why it is in neither government's nor business' interest to promote the 
theatre of enlightenment. The mere possibility of stumbling into a more enlightened state 
is and always has been the hope of the artist. The artists' purpose lies in the possibility 
that they may pull others along with them. 
Apparently, artists must choose to either affirm or challenge the status quo, and 
always contend with competing perceptions of the past and conceptions of the future, 
struggling for the hearts and mind of the present audience. It is in this arena that artists 
must secure resources for their work and sustenance for their livelihood. Remembering 
"the obstacles i t [ the F ederal Theatre] encountered and the nature and s wifhess o f i ts 
demise," Elmer Rice wondered if "worth-while theatre can flourish under governmental 
auspices, particularly when its existence depends upon the political calculations of 
partisan and semiliterate legislators" (160). The contemporary government subsidy 
provided by the National Endowment of the Arts has also proven dependent upon the 
political climate. Even though the establishing legislation of the NEA was designed to 
keep the government out of arts management, its policy of professional peer review, "the 
panel system which traditionally insulated the arts from government intervention," was 
severely tested and nearly destroyed by the political controversy aroused by the NEA's 
fimding of exhibits by Robert Mapplethorpe and Andreas Serrano in the 1980's (Brustein 
257-60). It seems any public money for the arts, even if initially dedicated without 
conditions, will eventually fall under political scrutiny. 
Still, from 1935 into 1938, the Federal government financed and managed a 
national theatre; then and truly, the fat lady sang. But as Federal support stopped, then 
began again with the NEA and has all but stopped once more, it's important to 
understand that when the fat lady sang, it might not have been with the voice of the 
Treasury's largesse. It might have been-in fact, likely was-the voice of the public 
clamoring for a truly recognizable and relevant theatre: 
In a short time Hollywood with its weekly average audience of eighty 
millions, and Broadway with its annual average audience of two million, 
realized the Federal Theatre was discovering and initiating an additional 
audience entirely new to the theatre . . . Federal Theatre . . . in the last few 
years has settled down to a definite weekly average audience of 6,500,000. 
(Lord 1) 
In 1935, it is estimated that "the total volume of business done by the [the movie] 
industry" was $400 million (Izod 93); by mid-1933, the nadir of the Depression, the total 
number of movie theatres had decreased nationally by some five thousand-leaving nine 
thousand as the basis for the industry's recovery (96); in 1939, the eight major studios 
released 388 films with a one screening per day potential of more than 3,250,000 annual 
screenings (1 19). In contrast, the Federal Theatre Project's total expenditures fiom May 
1936 to December 31, 1939 was just over $46 million; the Federal Theatre presented a 
total of 63,728 performances in a wide variety of venues in thirty-three states (Flanagan 
435), and mounted "approximately 1200, exclusive of radio," productions (432). 
That the Federal Theatre on a weekly and sustained basis attracted an audience 
just over a twelfth of the size of Hollywood's with a miniscule fraction of the budget, 
personnel and performance venues is truly remarkable. According to Tony Buttitta, a 
reporter for the Federal Theatre Magazine and press agent for several Project shows, talk 
among theatre folk had it that the Federal Theatre's growing ability to attract audiences 
was much the cause of the "red-baiting" that was its ultimate downfall. He quotes Mayer 
Portner, another staff writer at the magazine: "Shits in high places [referring to, among 
other bureaucratic overseers, New York City head of the WPA, Colonel Brehon 
Somervell] are ransacking that theatre book Hallie [Flanagan] wrote a few years ago to 
see if she's a No. 1 Stalin agent. They're being egged on by Hollywood and Broadway 
ghouls to get rid of her before the project takes away a few customers from their lousy 
shows" (Buttitta 3 1). 
Who's Left Out: What the Market Won't Provide 
The book Portner referred to, Shifting Scenes of the Modem European The-, 
published in 1928, was as much an account of Flanagan's artistic awakening as it was an 
inventory of national theatrical styles. In her interviews with the famous designer, 
Gordon Craig, she heard his opinion that "failure to believe characterizes the 
contemporary theatre [and] . . . Not until actors and spectators are united in common 
belief. . . would plays again become a revelation of the inner life and values as they had 
been w ith t he Greeks" ( Mathews 1 8). W hen s he arrived i n t he S oviet U nion i n 1 926, 
during the brief period between the tumult of the revolution and the crushing iron fist of 
Stalin's brutal regime, she found a "theatre transforming actors and audience into one . . . 
a theatre of great artistry and tremendous vitality, a theatre which seemed to serve a force 
beyond itself--one which dared to respond to a changing world" (19). 
While her later day detractors would scour her words for evidence of Communist 
sympathies, she had merely described the differences that shape national theatres and the 
relationship between performers and audiences within them. In her academic explorations 
at Harvard, with George Pierce Baker's 47 Workshop, on her own at Vassar College and 
later during her tour of Europe her goals were to "search out the best in contemporary 
theatre." Ultimately, however, she came to realize "that truly creative theatre was theatre 
which responded artistically and socially" to the world actors and audience share alike 
(17). Flanagan would likely have recognized many of the same shortcomings in the 
commercial theatre and Hollywood production-line as have Rice and Brustein, even 
without the occurrence of the Great Depression to put the economic structures in stark 
relief. But if there is even a portion of truth to the rumor Battitta mentions, it might be 
worthwhile to take a more detailed look at the Federal Theatre Project. What was it that 
created such demand from audiences that the major players in the entertainment industry 
may have felt so threatened to actually engage in sabotage, as Portner alleged, to protect 
market share? What was it about this new audience that gave artists more than more jobs, 
and that encouraged artists to challenge themselves with new works, new approaches and 
new styles? Just what untapped potential did the Federal Theatre discover in the 
relationship b etween artists and audience t hat n o o ther m odern t heatrical o rganization, 
before or since, has been able to match in scale or scope? 
While Hallie Flanagan's dream that a true "federation of theatres" would become 
"a permanent part of American life" has yet to be realized, from the point of view shared 
by the artists and audience, the Federal Theatre was more than "a temporary measure to 
help unemployed workers in show-business" (Kazacoff 7): "it gave an enormous, 
expanding number of venues for the production of new plays that the commercial theatre 
would never have produced or encouraged" (4). Indeed, the Federal Theatre intentionally 
assisted every region of the country to develop "its own 'indigenous drama' and 'native 
expression' [. . .] portray[ing] 'regional materials' and 'landscape."' The Federal Theatre 
insisted "that 'socially relevant' plays about contemporary issues replace stock 
productions performed in the hinterlands of mainstream America" (8). In short, Hallie 
Flanagan envisioned a theatre based upon a relationship far deeper than a simple 
commodity exchange--cash for entertainment. As Harry Hopkins, administrator of the 
WPA, explained his reasoning behind choosing her, an academic-not a professional, to 
develop and direct the Project: 
This is a non-commercial theatre . . . the profits won't be money profits. 
It's got to be run by a person who isn't interested just in the commercial 
type of show. . . . This is an American job, not just a New York job. I want 
someone who knows and cares about other parts of the country. 
(Flanagan 20). 
The Federal Theatre consciously offered to a variety of audiences individualized, 
regional offerings that "differed genuinely from the private, cosmopolitan character of the 
arts produced under the rubric of free enterprise" (Sporn 40). The cosmopolitanism of 
high art and culture and the private investigations of psychology are more exclusive than 
inclusive e xperiences; they are shaped b y an i ndividual's c onsciousness, o bserved and 
filtered through another individual's perception and remain a relationship between 
individuals regardless of the relative public-ness of the performance event. "The worldly 
cultivations of the cosmopolitan city and the private landscape of the self may seem" to 
cultivate "the social atomization closely connected to the way marketplace economy and 
marketplace culture are organized and manipulated on the grounds of competition, 
individualism, and theories of free trade". Equally insidious, from a civic point of view, 
and "is the prodigious increase in the population presumed to have no individual 
personality or culture. (33) Thus, the individual experience of an artist or the aesthetic 
forms of high art and culture are works of "private imagination'' not "public expectations 
and values" and, as such, "transforms the aesthetic product into what all products of 
human labor have become, a commodity for exchange" (33). 
The i ndependent e conomic s tructure o f c ultural e nterprise i n  the United S tates, 
i.e., the near total fieedom of expression and the relative fieedom fiom censorship 
governed only by market forces of producer/consumer choice, is the evolutionary result 
of modern capitalism's rise in the wake of feudalism and mercantilism. The principle of 
laissez-faire, by definition, might seem neutral as far as an artist's expression might be 
concerned, and that being encouraged "to create whatever he wants to create, to achieve 
whatever his talents enable him to achieve" (37) would be a source of profound artistic 
fieedom. But divorced fiom the sources of independent patronage that once existed, the 
artist's value as a usehl social voice or natural resource has been compromised. Both 
church and state, as  political institutions, argue social dogma across a landscape that 
shifts left or right over time. Left to swim in "the shark-infested waters where exchange 
value rules," the artist is less a partner in an ongoing social conversation than a hawker of 
wares; reduced to commodity status, both art and artist are valued only by the degree of 
demand for them. "Rather than lessening the breach between artist and public, it [laissez- 
faire capitalism] intensifies that alienation and drives the artist more relentlessly toward 
self-concern and cosmopolitanism" (37). Arising from this artistic alienation is the 
presumption that most people are incapable of culture and the critical judgment required 
to appreciate it. Cosmopolitanism is at the root of the "the conventional belief that 
popular theatre must be close to circus, whether as text or performance" (Boal 72), 
something that the majority of the population can only consume. To the contrary, Boal 
asserts "the most important characteristic of the theatre which addresses itself to the 
people must be its permanent clarity, its ability to reach the spectator-appealing to his 
intelligence and sensitivity-without circumlocution or mystification" (72). 
The adage that all politics is local might be advantageously applied here. Indeed, 
the Federal Theatre Project operated on the principle that art should also be local, and 
actively promoted the concept of regionalized theatre long before regional producing 
theatres became commonplace. Inherent in all the FTP activity to promote regional 
playwrights, subsidizing performers to return, with their art, to their rural roots, touring 
productions, and other development programs was an assumption that theatre can be a 
social conversation as well as an individual's psychological exploration. 
Most likely neither the bureaucrats who insistently aimed to limit the Federal 
Theatre to  a relief role nor the p oliticians who would eventually e liminate its subsidy 
thought of the Project in positive terms of populist social relations between artists and 
audiences. Importantly, the " art p rofessionals c alled o n t o administer the p rogram and 
many of the artists who worked in it" did (Sporn 44). Indeed, many of those within the 
project didn't consider their work to be competitive with the professional theatre, but 
supplementary; and since they sought to venture into uncharted cultural waters and 
establish a unique relationship with their audience, the Federal Theatre considered itself 
as an alternative. This was especially true regarding "the kind of content deemed worthy 
for dramatic treatment and . . . [the] modus operandi [italics original] of creative 
collaboration, a method of work diametrically opposite to the way the arts have 
developed" in American society: 
The theatre, by its nature, is always a form of collaboration. Yet its history 
under capitalism reflects a continual surrender of company character to the 
star system, whether the star be a dominating playwright, director as 
auteur [italics original], or performer. The company loses whatever 
standing it might have had as a significant creative force and becomes a 
frame or backdrop for one or more stellar individuals. The FTP 
deliberately turned its back on the star system to experiment with 
ensemble creativity. (44-45) 
The Federal Theatre set itself even fiuther apart from the mainstream by its 
inclusion of the public as participants in the Project's search for alternatives. Through 
such devices as "canvassing audience opinion after each performance," and by soliciting 
pre-production views and suggestions "from labor and community leaders thought to 
represent the common man and woman," the Federal Theatre built a truly populist 
theatre. By choosing to "produce plays by local writers immersed in the life and problems 
of farm-worker or immigrant, working-class communities" while also calling "for local 
companies to stage pageant dramas based on local and regional lore . . . The FTP was 
able to establish a close and reciprocal relationship with its publics." (45-46). 
Svmbiosis Restored-Temporarilv 
When considering what created this bond between the audience and artist it is 
important to understand that many of the Federal Theatre's audience were attending live 
theatre for the first time in their lives. Philip Barber, Director of the Federal Theatre 
Project for New York City, writing at the end of the 1936-37 theatrical season in Federal 
Theatre (the Project's in-house monthly publication), first quoted Hallie Flanagan's 
directive that "'our potential audience, the audience we are out to get, is an audience that 
has not been going to the theatre,"' then asserted "there can be no question that we are 
reaching this audience: the millions on WPA jobs and relief, the thousands of school 
children who have heretofore been entertained exclusively on movies, the almost 
unbelievable thousands of adults who had never seen a play" (Barber 7). 
A staff writer for Federal Theatre quoted Richard Lockridge, the theatre critic for 
The New York Sun, describing this audience: 
The WPA, if it has done nothing else, has brought into the legitimate 
playhouse a new, vociferous and rather engaging audience. (The WPA 
theatre, as a matter of fact, has done a good bit more than the commercial 
theatre during recent weeks). It is an audience which is not, I suspect, over 
familiar with the stage o f  flesh and blood and it has moments of rather 
startling naivetk. But it is an engaging audience. Its face is not frozen, it is 
not sitting on its hands, when it hisses it is not self-conscious and when it 
cheers it means it. It is young, lively, and I suspect, hard up. Probably the 
low admission fees charged at the WPA plays have had a large part in 
bringing it out of the neighborhood movie house [. . .I. It is an eager 
audience. It goes to the theatre only partly to pass the time. It goes, 
evidently, expecting to hear something said. ("People's" 6). 
Continuing in the same article, the writer draws an interesting analogy with the 
automobile industry. Realizing that the market for cars costing $2000 was limited, Henry 
Ford proved the market for $500 cars was not four times but twenty times larger. Thus 
"the audience which can spend 55 cents for a theatre ticket is not four times, but twenty 
times as large as the audience which can spend $2.00 and more. And the audience which 
can spend 25 cents is still larger in geometrical proportion" (6). 
What is perhaps the most important legacy of the Federal Theatre Project is 
revealed in the confluence of three separate threads of human cultural activity. First is the 
artists' need to work before an active and engaged audience such as that described by 
Richard Lockridge above and longed for by artists like Elmer Rice, Robert Brustein and 
Hallie Flanagan; second is the audience's need for "something of value, something it 
feels is beautiful or important to its own life," something other than "the road show and 
the local stock company-both inferior replicas of that peculiarly local and circumscribed 
theatre produced on Broadway" (6); third, it is not, as Henry Ford discovered, the 
building of a thing that makes them come but its affordability. The Federal Theatre 
Project afirrned that there are many theatre artists the market is not able to employ that 
remain ready, willing and able to please and astound an audience. The Federal Theatre 
Project discovered, perhaps not for the first time, that there is an audience eager to hear 
and see stories that come from and speak to their own regional experience and patient 
enough to return even if every production is not an instant classic. The Federal Theatre 
Project showed that live theatre can more than exist alongside the cinema, it can draw a 
large and loyal audience and thrive alongside an equally thriving movie business. The 
Federal Theatre Project ceased being an active theatre producing organization nearly 
sixty-five years ago. In its brief existence it forever changed the latent possibility of the 
American theatre: 
Twenty-five to fifty-five cents is the now established price scale of 
dramatic entertainment in America. Federal Theatre is brin~ing back the 
stage on the only basis that is today economicallv sound. It is broadening 
the base of the American theatre twenty times over, and by that token is 
making it so much the more American [emphasis added]. (6) 
The Federal Theatre's activities ranged from assigning Project workers to assisting the 
development of community theatres in rural America to providing venues, staff and 
funding for works like Eliot's verse drama, Murder in the Cathedral, and Orson Welles' 
"all-Negro Macbeth" in New York. At the time, it "would be unreasonable to expect 
anyone on Broadway to produce" either production, yet both are still regarded as artistic 
masterworks (Barber 8). It is not unreasonable to assume the aversion to risk in 
Broadway producers remains at least as high now as then. It is also not unreasonable to 
believe that the impetus towards producing groundbreaking work that the Federal Theatre 
became known for is encouraged today by the non-profit theatre, that sector's eye on 
Broadway success notwithstanding. It is however, unreasonable to assume that the 
audience pulled to the legitimate stage by the Federal Theatre was an aberration. The fat 
lady sang. And if it isn't "over till the fat lady sings," and every theatre artist harbors 
some hope she won't become totally "virtual," it is important we first understand exactly 
what institutions and organizations have arisen to dominate the performing arts and to 
comprehend how much human and financial capital is at stake. 
Chapter 4 
TRAGICOMIC ECONOMICS: 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES IN THE PERFORMING ARTS 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey for the Movie and Entertainment sector of 
the American economy estimates: 
[. . .] that in 2002, U.S. consumers will spend a total of $88 billion-about 
$810 per household--on entertainment products. This includes $44 billion 
for T V p rograrnming (delivered v ia b ask c able, p ay c able, and satellite 
programming), $9 billion for theatrical movies, $22 billion for rental and 
purchase of prerecorded videocassettes and digital videodiscs (DVDs) and 
$13 billion for recorded music. (Graves 7) 
The Survey further estimates that the television industry will also earn $61 billion more 
in advertising income, and another $40 billion in international sales of theatre tickets and 
home v ideo p urchase and rental o f A merican-made movies. Additionally, The Theatre 
Communications Group (the major industry association for not-for-profit theatres) states 
in its most recent survey of American nonprofit theatres, Theatre Facts 2001 , that this 
niche of the performing arts industry contributed $923 million to the U.S. economy (TCG 
1). The 1997 Economic Census of the U. S. Census Bureau reports that 1,600 taxable 
theatre companies (including dinner theatres) received over $2.3 billion (United States, 
Bridge, 1). Disregarding the $13 billion share earned by the recording industry, this adds 
up to nearly a $1 80 billion entertainment industry largely derived from, if not entirely 
based upon, dramatic story-telling traditions and intimate performerlaudience 
relationships. In other words, it is a sizable house that the actors, along with their 
audiences, have built. 
The Financial Portrait of Actors 
Unfortunately, the distinguishing characteristic of contemporary live theatre, 
motion picture, and television production is the under-utilization of its unique creative 
resources, especially actors. The industrial organization of the performing arts has 
developed a financial structure that insures the greatest portion of revenues do not go to 
the creators of performances but are retained as profits for distributors (see Table 2.2, p. 
26). This great disparity in artists' compensation is coupled with chronic under- 
employment of professional performers that is far greater than the current national 
unemployment rate of approximately 5.8%. The Actor's Equity Association (hereafter 
Equity) reported in its 2002 Annual Report that only 43.7% of its 39,507 members in 
good standing worked professionally during the 2001-02 season, and only 14.5% were 
professionally employed, o n average, during any given w eek. M edian annual e arnings 
averaged only $6,277 per member (Pace 2). The Screen Actor's Guild (hereafter SAG) 
warned in its web page for beginning actors that more than 85% of its members earned 
less than $5,000 in 1996 ("So You Wanna Be An Actor" I), while Prindle reports the 
oficial rate of unemployment within SAG "at any given moment" is also 85% (11). 
SAG, in its 2002 update of "So You Wanna Be An Actor," estimates 90% of its 
"membership must rely on income outside the acting profession for food and shelter" 
("Beginning Actors" 1). 
There is considerable cross membership within the performers' unions. Equity 
estimates over 60% of its members also belong to SAG and the American Federation of 
Television and Radio Artists, or AFTRA (Hoffer 1). Consequently, there could easily be 
some duplication in these statistics. Some have also argued that many in the performers' 
unions are not career-oriented professionals, but individuals who earn the right to obtain a 
union card for a single appearance in "real people" type commercials or in a film as a 
speaking e xtra, thus s hrinking the rate o f u nemployed career a ctors i n S AG c loser to, 
perhaps, 20%. This figure is "still horrendous fiom the perspective of almost any other 
profession," and while this issue might conceivably be addressed through collective 
bargaining, performer's unions have traditionally been loath to negotiate job security-a 
primary function of most labor unions (Prindle 11). What may be even more striking than 
this union tolerance of high levels of unemployment and low annual earnings is that they 
exist in an industry where "seven-digit movie deals make headlines" (SAG 1) and films, 
such as John Cameron's recent Titanic, can gross over $1.8 billion worldwide (Picard 8) 
This contrast between average actor salaries and gross earnings is a reflection of 
both the glamour that attracts many so-called actor "wannabes" (SAG I), and the 
industry's domination by a small handful of companies. The periodic resurgence of the 
"star search" entertainment format attests to the eternal hope of "making it" that holds 
some performers. Economic dominance of the performing arts industry by movie 
producers is long established and may be considered as an attribute of the industrial 
revolution and subsequent mass marketing. Poggi notes that the timing of the movie 
industry's commercial ascendance and the decline of live theatre attendance is not a 
coincidence (39). It results fi-om the confluence of two factors: the rising costs of live 
theatrical production and distribution and the increasingly eficient economies of scale 
enjoyed by the movie industry (Poggi, 78). Indeed, in 1929, prior to the Great 
Depression, Americans spent $720 million to attend movie screenings (Prindle 16). In the 
same year, Americans spent $127 million to attend live theatrical, musical, and operatic 
performances combined (Baumol, 44). As indicated by the U.S. Census Bureau economic 
census previously cited, audience attendance is tilted even more favorably towards the 
movie industry today. Consequently, it is the financial structure of the dominant sector of 
the performing arts market, i.e., movie production, which must bear scrutiny as the 
institutional cause of the high rate of performing artists' unemployment. 
The Financial Structure of the Entertainment Business 
The giant conglomerates that dominate the industry are integrated both 
horizontally across industry sectors (Vogel 57) and vertically in financing, producing, 
and distributing (McConnell 3). The horizontal integration of the movie industry is 
marked by such corporate interrelationships as telephone companies (Bell Atlantic, for 
instance) having interest in cable companies (Showtime) which are merged with studios 
(Pararnount-+xvned by Viacom) that own a subsidiary video distributor (Blockbuster); 
other major studios also own television and cable networks (Vogel58). 
Six film distributors (the Walt Disney Co., Viacom Inc., Sony Corp., Fox 
Entertainment Group, AOL Time-Warner Inc., and Universal Studios, Inc.) "typically 
account for at least 70% of box office revenues" (Graves 7). Also, of these six 
conglomerates, only Sony Corp. is not afiliated with a major domestic cable or broadcast 
television network: Disney's ABC was third in the primetime Nielson ratings for the first 
week of the 2002-03 television season with 9.9 million viewers, Viacom's CBS was first 
with 13.9, followed by "Fox Entertainment's FOX with 7.1 million, AOL Time Warner's 
WB at 4.5 million, and Viacom's UPN at 4.2 million" (Graves 3). Still, Sony Corp. does 
produce and distribute both local and national television programming domestically and 
internationally and does own some 40 cable channels through its international subsidiary, 
Sony Pictures Television International (Sony 1). 
Such control over distribution in the secondary markets increases the ability of the 
studios to maximize profit from any given motion picture by controlling, or "cascading," 
the release of the various forms that film may take. Basically, these conglomerates are 
"selling the same product at different prices to different buyers" at different times (Vogel 
75-6). This horizontal integration of studios and secondary distribution networks has 
become especially important considering recent changes in the film industry's sources of 
revenue: 
Table 2.1: Film industry sources of revenue estimated, 1980 and 1995; major filmed 
entertainment companies in the U.S.; total not exact due to rounding. 
1980 
$ millions 
Theatrical: 
Domestic 
% 
Foreign 
Home video 
1,183 
Pay cable 
Network TV 
Syndication 
1995 
$ millions 
91 1 
280 
Foreign TV 
Made for TV films 
YO 
29.6 
240 
430 
150 
Total 
22.8 
7.0 
100 
700 
3,994 1 100.0 1 18,000 1 100.0 I 
2,600 
6.0 
10.8 
3.8 
14.4 
2,300 
7,300 
2.5 
17.5 
40.6 
1,400 
250 
750 
7.8 
1.4 
4.2 
1,200 
2,200 
6.7 
12.2 
Especially noteworthy is the relationship between theatrical releases, domestic and 
foreign, and video releases. Though the percentage of revenue from all theatrical releases 
has shrunk from 5 2.4% to 2 7.2% o f t otal revenue, the revenue e arned from the home 
video market has grown from 7.0% to 40.6%. Taken in aggregate, these markets have 
grown as a source of revenue for the movie industry. They accounted for 59.4% of the 
total amount Americans spent for entertainment in 1980 and 67.8% in 1985. As factors of 
distribution, they have no bearing on the compensation guaranteed by the Standard 
Minumum Contracts negotiated by performers' unions. 
It is this aggregate that best expresses the dominance over distribution that 
horizontal integration maintains for the major studios. In 1944, the Department of Justice 
moved to curtail studio control over distribution through vertical integration. Prior to the 
final settlement of this action by the U.S. Supreme court in 1948, the studios also 
controlled most of the movie screens in the country. Though the studios lost their 
immediate control over their product's exhibition, this judgment roughly coincided with 
the emergence of television (Vogel 33). Since then, the control of exhibition has been 
reasserted horizontally in the secondary market. 
The Distribution of Profits and Performers' Compensation 
The primary market, i.e., a film's production and initial theatrical release, is 
where a film's value is first established, however, and it is in the vertical integration of 
this market that studios are able to both minimize risk and maximize profit: 
The existence of profitable studio enterprises in the face of apparent losses 
for the "average" picture can be reconciled only when it is realized that the 
heart of a studio's business is distribution and financing and that, 
therefore, the brunt of marketing and production-cost risk is often 
deflected andlor transferred to (sometimes tax-sheltered) outside investors 
and producers [while] studio profits are highly dependent on distribution 
and other fee income. (Vogel86-87) 
Indeed, while the industry relies upon many small production service companies, 
independent producers, and the like to create their products, "the majo rs...still 
consistently generate the bulk of industry revenues (an estimated 90% of gross domestic 
film rentals)" (Vogel 52). Using Leedy's table below (Table 2.2, page 66), Vogel 
"illustrates the concepts that operate in a typical production-financing-distribution 
agreement, particularly deferred payments to the writer and director, profit participations 
by the leading actors, and contingent compensations to the financier and producer". 
Leedy's table "hrther shows how a $14 million (negative cost) picture earning $100 
million in distributor's rentals might generate $16 million of profit for financier and 
producer before participations and $8.1 million after adjustment for participations and 
deferments" (1 03-4). 
It is important to note that a distributor's fees come off the top of all film grosses. 
In Leedy's example, that equals approximately one third of earnings before expenses are 
accounted for and the profits to be shared are calculated. Moreover, this table "correctly 
portrays typical domestic theatrical-distribution fees [which . . .] are, by long standing 
industry practice, largely non-negotiable. But because the charges are unrelated to actual 
costs, they will, on relatively rare occasions, be adjusted in order to retain the services of 
important producers" (Vogel 103- 105). 
Table 2.2: Revenues and costs for a major theatrical release, circa 1992. 
Gross revenue 
Subject to a 30% distribution fee: 
Theatrical film rental (U.S. and Canada) 
Nontheatrical film rental 
Royalty on home video 
U.S. network television 
Total 
Subject to a 40% distribution fee: 
Foreign film rental 
Foreign television license fees 
Royalty on foreign home video 
Television, pay & syndication 
Total 
Subject to a 15% distribution fee: 
Merchandise royalties 
Advertising sales 
Total 
Total gross revenue 
Distribution fee 
30% X $60,000,000 
40% X $39,000,000 
15% X $1,000,000 
Total distribution fee 
Balance 
Distribution expenses: 
Cooperative advertising 
Other advertising and publicity 
Release prints, etc. 
Taxes 
Trade association fees and other 
Bad debts 
All other expenses 
Total distribution expenses 
Balance 
Production cost 
Interest thereon 
Total Production cost 
Net profit before participation 
Deferments paid 
Participations in gross and net 
Total 
Net profit to be split 5050 
Source: Leedy, D.J. Motion Picture Distribution: An Accountant's Perspective. 1-3 and 
unpublished updates. Los Angeles: David Leedy, C.P.A., P.O. Box 27845,1980. (Vogel, 104) 
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Vogel identifies the industry as "contract driven," reporting that some would say 
movies aren't Hollywood's major product, deals are (65). Indeed, many decisions 
regarding possible productions are subjective, and studios and producers often rely upon 
talent packages to lower risk (Vogel66-67). Between 1990 and 2000, 32% of the movies 
releases earning over $100 million at the box office starred one or more of only seven 
performers: Tom Hanks, Julia Roberts, Robin Williams, Jim Carrey, Tom Cruise, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, and Bruce Willis. Additionally, these stars have each appeared in at 
least five $100 million dollar pictures since 1990 (Standard and Poor's 14). Vogel 
argues, somewhat obviously perhaps, that bargaining power, i.e., "clout," is the only 
thing that matters in negotiating either financing or contracts (92). 
Individual clout, or "star power," has made some actors extremely wealthy in an 
extremely bountiful industry. The irony is that most actors can't make a living practicing 
the acting profession. Since all profit terms in Hollywood are "defined" and even the 
non-negotiable i s " adjustable," i t w ould appear no c oncrete reason s tands b etween t he 
bounty of the industry and the penury of the profession. The challenge is to reenergize 
collective clout and focus it toward the goal of professional autonomy and employment. 
The Future: Promise or Peril 
Traditionally, salaries are negotiated as performer compensation via the 
performers' unions, usually in terms of salary minimums established for various types of 
productions. Indeed, Equity was born out of the abysmal working conditions, especially 
poor con~pensation, of actors at the turn of the century (Rogers 2,3). SAG'S origins can 
be directly traced to the studios' attempt to slash wages in half to protect profits during 
the Great Depression (Prindle 17). The performers' unions' historical focus on 
establishing minimum levels of actor compensation is based upon an awareness of the 
inherently s ubjective n ature o f c asting, the profession's hiring p rocesses. T his c oupled 
with the impact of the studios' blacklists of the 1950's have made these unions careful 
not to overly or overtly challenge producers (Prindle 10-1 1). It is left to the actors' agents 
to then secure M h e r  financial participation, usually a percentage of a specific gross and 
known as 'gross points," as additional compensation for their clients. These participation 
deals are entirely dependent upon clout and are "limited only by the imagination and 
bargaining abilities of those who negotiate them" (Vogel 105). By seeking percentages 
on a number of different grosses, most importantly the distributor's gross, agents seek to 
negotiate compensation for their clients that is more commensurate with their 
contribution to productivity-their "star power" (Vogel 107). 
Studios typically try to limit compensation for performers while preserving their 
claim to unlimited compensation for themselves (Prindle 25). And though the studios 
have not created the 85% unemployment rate among professional actors, they have relied 
upon the glamour of the profession to maintain an overly abundant talent pool. As 
important as "star power" is to the studios' marketing departments, however, unknown 
actors of professional caliber have also proven themselves to be a non-substitutable 
resource (Prindle 14). The producers recognized the artistic leverage of the membership's 
rank and file after attempting to use amateur performers during a TV commercials strike 
in 1979-eventually withdrawing the replacements and meeting the unionized 
performers' demands (Prindle 13). However, this leverage may someday be eclipsed by 
technology. James Cameron, director of Titanic "predicts continued breakthroughs in 
computer-generated characters that interact with live actors and [the] development of 
photo-realistic humanoids capable of believable emotional performances" (Picard 1999 
xxii). Again, the impact of new technology is amplified by the economic incentives to 
replace expensive human labor with comparatively cheap mechanical, or in this case, 
digital facsimile. 
Cameron has recognized two essential and intertwined financial considerations 
here: the importance of live actors, "stars," is essential to the marketing and risk 
management strategies of the studioldistributor, and the reduction of other labor costs 
(supporting players and extras) through technology is essential to financing the stars' 
compensation. Given that all players in this market, studios, performers, and audience all 
derive some benefit fiom the "star system," it is unlikely to be dismantled or replaced. 
The system generates studio profits, encourages actors' dreams, and provides celebrities 
for the audience. The system, however, does not compensate all players equally or fairly. 
The studios guarantee themselves profits that are unrelated to costs (Vogel 103). The 
audience is increasingly offered products where 50% of a picture's production budget is 
for marketing (Vogel 85), indicating that either the product lacks genuine demand or that 
the individual products are largely uniform. Either way, it reflects a market structured to 
satis@ the interests of the financierldistributors much more than the audience. It is the 
performers, however, who p ay the h ighest p rice and receive t he 1 east return from this 
system: dreams may feed the soul, but they can't pay the rent, and for most actors, 
practicing their profession does not pay the rent. 
Chapter 5 
THE PRODUCERS: ACTOR-MAMAGEMENT REDUX 
To think that the days of human actors are numbered may seem ridiculous on its 
face, but it's not unimaginable. According to the SAGJAFTRA Coordinating Merger 
Committee meeting minutes for the August 24, 1989 meeting, SAG representative and 
Committee Vice-Chair, Mr. Yale Summers, "felt the merger is so important that without 
it the unions would be doomed within ten to fifteen years" ("SAG/AFTRA9'). Though 
both unions still exist, despite the passage of time and the failure to merge, the 
technological and political threats against them have only increased and the reasonable 
expectation is that the trend will continue. In fact, the recent strike by the Broadway 
musicians, Local 802 of the American Federation of Musicians, is highly instructive of 
both the current condition of union power and the present danger posed by technology. 
walk in^ the Walk: Contemporary Union Militancy and Solidaritv 
The issue of Broadway pit orchestras' minimum size is not new, nor is the 
pressure technology places upon musicians: 
Over the decades, the musicians' union has lost its fight to preserve 
jobs in the face of new technologies. In the silent-film era, many movie 
theaters hired unionized musicians to perform to accompany the films, but 
after talking movies were introduced, theaters fought for and won the right 
to show films without live musicians. As phonograph technology grew 
more sophisticated, radio stations started replacing live unionized 
musicians with records, and many nightclubs replaced musicians with 
tapes and records. 
More recently, the development of synthesizers and other 
computerized sources of music that function as virtual electronic 
orchestras has led producers to say the orchestra minimums are needless 
and shameful featherbedding. (Greenhouse) 
Though the contract negotiations were protracted, once the strike was called, 
settlement came very quickly, though not easily or without compromise. Producers had 
been fairly certain both the stagehands' and actors' unions would cross the musicians' 
picket 1 ines. P nor t o  the strike deadline, i n fact, i t w as the s tagehands that 1 oaded the 
necessary electronic equipment, the virtual orchestras, for the actors' rehearsals. It was 
the expectation of the producers' that using this same equipment, stagehands and actors 
would then continue performances after the musicians walked out (McKinley). Given the 
producers' c onfidence i n their ability t o  negate the c ollective b argaining ability o f t he 
musicians' union, it might not be wholly surprising that their initial offer was the 
complete elimination of the minimums. "In a sense, the producers," according to one City 
University labor expert, Stanely Aronowitz, were "trying to industrialize the artistic 
process," while "for the unions," according to Cornell University professor of labor 
relations, Richard Hurd, "the future of their profession is at stake" (Greenhouse). 
When the dust settled after a weekend without musicals on Broadway and a 
marathon negotiating session urged by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, the 
new minimum set for the largest theatres was 18 chairs, a 25% decrease. According to 
Lisa Pike, a French horn player for 42nd Street, "I'm very disappointed. In the last 
negotiations, we lost eight chairs over all of Broadway. Now in some cases we're losing 
eight chairs a show." D espite t he s uccess i n s aving the B roadway o rchestras for now, 
there remain strong misgivings: 
"Some music professionals say that orchestras will be forever diminished. 
'The reality is, if you say, "We could really use two more for the brass 
section," it's going to be, "Too bad, 18 is the number, figure it out,"' said 
Paul Gemignani, a prominent music director. 'You won't be able to bring 
all the color,' he added. 'It's like saying to Van Gogh, 'Sorry, no orange."' 
(Pogrebin 2) 
Dissatisfaction with the half-loaf nature of this settlement has not, however, dampened a 
growing reaffirmation of the solidarity among the artists in the New York theatre. And 
though the refusal of the stagehands and actors to break the musicians' strike was as 
much an expression of self-interest as solidarity, its occurrence is nevertheless still 
encouraging. Affirming this tactical necessity after the settlement, Alan Eisenberg, 
executive director of Actors' Equity, said "The [producers'] league never seemed to 
understand us when we said the actors would never cross because they didn't like to 
perform before virtual orchestras. Their strategy went awry." Still, the united front that 
led to the success, albeit limited, of the musicians' strike "grew out of the unusually close 
cooperation among the unions in reopening shows after the 911 1 attack closed Broadway 
for two days" (2) In response to the attacks on that date, "every union and guild took 
unprecedented, across-the-board pay cuts in order to keep a number of long-running 
Broadway shows from closing," not only saving (according to Eisenberg and Anthony 
DePaulo, Business Manager for Local 1 of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage 
Employees) "'New York's most important industry,"' but building a: 
[. . . ] coalition that represents 13 organizations, with 75,000 members and 
all aspects of the Broadway Theatre, from actors, musicians, playwrights, 
directors and choreographers, to set, costume and lighting designers, 
stagehands, ushers and ticket-takers, box office personnel, wardrobe, 
hairstylists, porters, press agents and company managers. (3) 
Even more encouraging for the performers' unions, perhaps, is the ongoing efforts 
to bridge the divide between the three actors' organizations; although their failure to 
merge into one all-encompassing organization is a decades old issue, it is an issue that 
will probably remain on the table for some time to come. Mr. Eisenberg, after a ''summit 
meeting" in January 2003 with the leadership of SAG and AFTRA, remarked to Esuitv 
News, the union's own newspaper, that "he felt a 'real spirit of cooperation' among the 
unions and anticipates further contact in the future" ("Eisenberg" 1). 
Recalling SAG president Gilbert's letter to the membership (page 36), it seems 
apparent that the cries of alarm are virtually industry-wide: 
Eisenberg, noting an Equity Council resolution from November 2002, 
"expressed growing concern about a variety of issues, including 
organizing, loss of jobs, affordable housing, rising health costs and 
legislative matters on the state and national level" and urged "encouraging 
increased communication among SAG, AFTRA and AEA, leading to joint 
action on matters of mutual concern." (1) 
Patrick Quinn, president of AEA adds "with global corporate entities now controlling the 
media and live entertainment, there's a lot of work that needs to be done on behalf of 
performing artists" (9). Underlying all the differences between the three unions, however, 
is a single issue that has never been resolved in their entire history. That issue of course, 
is whether it is best to organize as crafts, with all the conflicts of interest that that implies, 
or as an industry, with all the emphasis of labor solidarity that that requires. 
Talkinp the Talk: Redefinin~ Union A l o n ~  Progressive Models 
This issue continues to arise even with single organizations. In discussing the 
Special Agreements recently negotiated for several national tours, two Equity members 
suggested very different responses to the concessions producers' demand to keep their 
road show casts unionized. In a letter to the editor of Equity News, Tom Judson writes: 
If the biggest threat is that producers say they will send out non-union 
tours if they don't receive the concessions they ask for, why not make it 
impossible for them to do so?. . . open up Actors' Equity to any actor who 
is willing to pay the $1,000 initiation fee. . . . such a move would decimate 
the non-union talent pool, thereby forcing producers to deal with Equity 
on terms that would be advantageous to us. ("Letters" 2) 
In another letter to the editor of Equity News, Russell Leib writes: 
Producers claim that the cost of mounting and maintaining a national tour 
with AEA members is too high and that their only option is to use non- 
union performers or negotiate lower salaries and per diems. Does this 
refrain sound familiar? 
. . . ~ E A i s a  business unionthat doesnot act l ikeonewhenit  
allows that this producers' argument is valid. We cannot compromise 
ourselves when a tour rolls on union wheels, is moved by union muscle, is 
managed by union managers, plays in union houses, is designed by union 
designers, is built in union shops, is dressed by union dressers or calls on 
the services of any other theatrical union. ("Letters" 2) 
Labeling Equity as a bbbusiness union," the writer's delineation of all the separate crafts 
involved in a road production (or most others, for that matter) reinforces the notion that if 
concessions a re to  b e m ade, there are o ther 1 aborers, rather than actors, who c ould a s 
easily be called to give them. It is this narrow definition of self-interest that the 
producers' organizations have historically found so lucrative to exploit. And it is the 
inclusiveness of Tom Judson's suggestion that generates the labor solidarity producers' 
have always found easiest to defeat through tactics of divide and conquer, tactics 
designed to work best with the craft organized business unions. 
The struggle to unionize Hollywood, indeed most labor history, reveals the 
efficacy of these tactics. It is also important to realize the ensuing arrangements 
sometimes served the institutional interests of both the producers and some unions' 
leaders more than they served the needs of the rank-and-file. This was uncovered by one 
high-ranking churchman and Los Angeles community leader, Father Dunne, who: 
Wrote a well-researched report for the Archbishop of Los Angeles in the 
late 1940s that examined the causes of the famous Hollywood studio 
strikes of 1945-7. His final report, eventually published by the strikers 
themselves, was a scathing indictment of both the union leaders and the 
managers of the studios. In short, Dunne argues that the studio bosses paid 
off crime syndicate representatives to hold down wages; union leaders 
stole from the members through special assessments; and union leaders 
and studio bosses colluded to undermine democratic unionism in 
Hollywood. 
The rancor of those events continues to haunt the industry. More 
importantly, as the chips fell in 1945-7, so they lie today. The winners of 
that time dynastically picked their successors and today's labor structure 
in the US film industry is based largely on the deals worked out at that 
time. (Nielson viii-ix) 
The point here is not to condemn specific unions or labor organization in general for the 
occasional corruption of its leadership or to suggest that such corruption is endemic, but 
to realize that historical events, such as the labor movement, can extend over many 
generations and when certain conditions seem to persist over decades, as suggested 
above, it only seems like a permanent condition. It is also important to understand that: 
Although not as highly professionalized as corporate management, 'the 
union leader is a business executive. His accountability is not limited to 
the membership-it is extended to government agencies, arbitrators, 
courts of law, and other institutions which play a large role in regulating 
the union's operations' and to the corporation with whom they share the 
responsibility for the administration of the contract. (Jeter 81) 
Granted, leadership of the two largest actors' unions, SAG and AFTRA, is 
moving toward an industrial model of organization. It is again asking the membership of 
both organizations to agree to merge (Schiller). This issue of combining the different 
"crafts" of acting, i.e., stage, movie and television performers first arose in the squabbles 
between the vaudevillian White Rats and stage actors at the turn of the last century. In the 
case of SAGIAFTRA, merger had been studied since 1948, actively negotiated since 
1979 and ultimately rejected in a dual membership referendum in early 1999. Both 
unions' memberships were 50% dual, or "crossover" members, i.e., holding cards for 
both organizations. ("Loose"). It is being considered again now in direct response to the 
worsening economic realities of union-busting ''runaway" production in countries beyond 
union jurisdiction and increasing concentration of media industry power. While it is 
probably necessary that a professional leadership staff exist to counter the level of legal 
and financial expertise the media conglomerates bring to the fray, it is apparent that a 
century of business unionism has only slowed the juggernaut of industrialization in the 
performing arts. Necessary as the institution of the business union is to the working actor, 
a business union approach cannot be the entire answer. 
In other words, it is imperative to consider the professional lives of those 
unnoticed actors in every stratum of the profession, working and idled, extras and 
journeymen as well as super-stars. It is impossible to examine the effects industrialization 
has had upon the performing arts without facing the anti-labor bias of American society. 
A thorough understanding of c urrent production practice must consider the dominance 
asserted over performing artists by business people. Finally, the global nature of the post- 
modern economy must be considered if the dilemma of scale is to be solved. Economies 
of scale required by business tend to counter the scale of human intimacy required of 
performance., and the gulf between is growing. This last stage of industrialization, the 
globalization process, is by no means complete-the technical evolution of the 
performing arts continues apace-but its thrust, should those previously unnoticed 
participants re-emerge, may be redirected. 
Such redirection would require the most difficult social effort. If the true human 
dimension of the performing arts is to remain anything other than an artifact suitable for 
museum mounting, it must be funded. And that requires a decision to redistribute wealth. 
Current political and economic realities, as well as history, would seem to eliminate 
government subsidy, at least for the moment, as impractical. That leaves the marketplace 
as the only other source of funding. Most theatres already depend on the marketplace for 
both the direct support of the audience and charitable donations, but this is an incomplete 
understanding of an artist's relationship to the marketplace. It tends to deny the artist's 
identity as a worker, and especially neglects to empower the artist in the face of the 
cultural dominance exercised by multi-national mega-corporations. And it permits the 
dominance of business unionism that has and continues to divide performers against 
themselves. 
Finding Focus: Making a Future Requires a Past 
To mourn the Federal Theatre Project's demise as an early casualty of the anti- 
Communism that found its most vicious expression in the McCarthy era is to rue but a 
portion of the loss. Much of the progressive labor movement was also shattered by the 
anti-Communist fervor of the 1930's, 40's and 50's. As Nielson and Maille recount in 
their history of the struggle between the progressive and business unionists in 
Hollywood, Hollywood's Other Blacklist: 
What was really lost was the idea of working people educating each other 
toward building better lives. The labor progressives were acutely aware of 
the link between education and progress for working people-not just 
training for jobs but training for life. The labor progressives wanted US 
citizens, regardless of their class and status, to take an active role in the 
economy and government. (ix) 
Indeed, the loss of the progressive ideal has been much to industry's gain: 
In the post-Reagan era such an ideal seems woefblly idealist and 
impractical. We are so very far fiom that sort of world today. Workers in 
many strata of the US economy see themselves more as consumers and 
less as producers. They see their jobs as a means to achieve a certain level 
of purchasing power and comfort. Through division of labor power, they 
are terribly abstracted fiom the production process. Business owners, for 
their part, view much of their labor force as just so many widgets that they 
can do with as they please to make their profits. (xi). 
Given that the relationship between performers and audience has developed over 
several millennia, that it has also managed to overcome the occasional ban by church or 
state and even survived the recent attempt to replace the Broadway musicians with virtual 
orchestras, it isn't likely to ever completely disappear. The comfort in that lies, however, 
in a foolish sort of paradise, as the gains won by the theatrical and movie unions in the 
twentieth century suffer increasing assault in the twenty-first. It is equally unlikely that 
capitalism, a politicaVeconomic system developed over the last half millennia, will 
disappear. Considering the fate of the alternative political movements of the last century, 
it is a system that, so far at least, is quite resistant to direct assault. And it is adaptable. 
Therein lies both the hope and despair that actors and other theatrical workers will ever 
escape the "grotesque, double-natured" bind of being both "an artisan-who in some 
respects resembles the artisans of old but who differs from them in now being a maker of 
prototypes to be mass produced [. . .]-and an entrepreneur, an owner of a commodity 
which he must sell . . . [though] what he owns is a very small part of each reproduced 
item that makes up the mass going to market" (Spom 34). As every performer knows, 
without "clout" that small part has little value; without the strength of numbers a union 
provides, that small part has practically none. 
Taking Stape: An Actors' Theatre for Tomorrow-Todav 
Being adaptable, the current system of production is responsive to pressure and 
influence exerted from within and without and has managed to grow and prosper by 
many means including, but not limited to, coercion and co-option. With that in mind, it is 
time to seek alternatives that, like the Federal Theatre, can co-exist with the current 
modes of production and economic organization and supplement the present mass- 
marketing trends of cultural expression with the human bonds represented by a regional 
and collaborative, including audience, approach to theatre. 
John Russell Brown, an English director and drama professor, has found that 
traditional live theatre is striving, on both sides of the Atlantic, to adapt to shrinking 
audiences. In Britain, trying "New theatre spaces, industrial working practices, 
industrious fi-inge activities, expensive productions, and short-termed seasons have all 
been tried and have failed to answer theatre's acknowledged crisis. Even bigger subsidies 
have had little effect." We should not be surprised, he continues, since "theatre history 
and theatre theory tell us that more basic solutions are needed, that practice of the art will 
have to change, reforming theatre's organization, production methods, performances, and 
audiences" (3 38). 
What is happening in mainstream American theatre, in Brown's view, does 
approach the basic level of solution history might suggest is necessary. It is potentially 
groundbreaking and yet, unfortunately, still less than effective. Brown cites American 
Canvas, a four year "consultation about the state of all the arts-theatre was not 
considered on its own-," published by the National Endowment for the Arts. He found 
that despite the call "for nothing less than 'the redefinition of American culture': [where] 
all the arts should work together; community needs should be met by amateurs as well as 
professionals; young persons and children should be educated in the arts and the 
'Information Age' entered on all fronts. . . ." the conclusions NEA reached were 
decidedly o Id h at: " seek p ermanent funding [ and . . . ] I dentify n ew revenue s treams." 
Brown argues more money, "bureaucracy and consultation have not, or could not, 
address the truly basic problems: the quality of what happens on stage and the responses 
of audiences" (338). Throwing more money at new institutions is pointless; the 
institutions must be reconfigured if not reinvented. 
The recent rebuilding and financially successful opening of the Globe Theatre in 
London has offered a glimpse of the potential in rediscovering the value of "an unusual 
and free relationship between audiences standing in its open yard ands actors performing 
on its open platform stage. This has proved a major attraction of seeing a play at this 
theatre, a new experience that has won such a large and varied audience that its 
popularity tomorrow seems to be assured" (340). Brown feels the living performance 
traditions of popular theatre fiom cultures other than our own are a source of lessons and 
inspiration for reinvigorating the relationship between audiences and actors. He is not 
suggesting that these techniques be copied or transplanted but studied for "principles and 
practices that enable audiences to be held in rapt attention, ignoring the more readily 
available pleasures of film or television." Even more important are the "small groups of 
actors, often with a writer, designer, technician, or director amongst them. They . . . 
always h ave to  d iscover and build their o wn audiences. They take risks, b ecause they 
have little to lose, and so are able to attempt what more experienced theatres would not 
even consider" (341). There is a special importance to this because: 
Theatre is in special danger of getting out of step with its public because to 
change would mean re-inventing itself, devising new wheels within the 
wheels of a complicated mechanism. Theatre is biased towards traditional 
ways of operating because they seem to offer security-new plays 
produced in old ways, young actors absorbed into old companies-but 
today's theatre will have to be bolder and more imaginative if it is to 
survive for tomorrow. Only by making very basic changes will it be able 
to hold a mirror up to our lives and, once more, draw crowded audiences 
to share the fierce intensities and enjoy the pleasures of its illusions. (339) 
Brown is clear about what we need to do, where we might look for ideas and inspiration, 
and who is best suited to do the job. He remains unconvinced that money alone offers any 
real solution to theatre's problems. Funding increases tend to go where fbnding has been 
andlor already is, so simply securing increasing dollar amounts isn't the whole answer. A 
more fundamental response is required. There is an undeniable potential that exists when 
actors are placed in close proximity to an audience. The problem today, given the gross 
underemployment of actors and the artistic narrowness of most commercial art, is how to 
put large numbers of actors in close proximity to large nun~bers of audiences. When 
mixed together in the spirit of discovery, artists and audience can face together the risks 
and dangers they commonly confront. Individual actualization and social affirmation for 
the audience is best realized when some sense of security is permitted the artists. If the 
actors can eat regularly, if the price of admission need not cover the cost of their 
livelihood, if resources could be allocated to fully employ large numbers of actors, then 
large numbers of audiences would be able to reap the large potential that exists within 
themselves to successfully wrestle with their world. 
Such a vision of the artistlaudience relationship preceded civilization. The 
shamanist roots of the performing arts assume an intermediary role between worlds real 
and potential that places the shamadactor outside commerce. Commerce, however, may 
be said to be the defining characteristic of our world today. How, then, can the 
artistiaudience relationship sought by Rice, Brustein, Flanagan, Boa1 and Brown, among 
so many others, ever flourish under such circumstances? Michael Denning, in his study 
of the Popular Front milieu that produced and supported the Federal Theatre Project, 
Cultural Front, considers commerce the hallmark of modernity. 
It is Denning's contention that the modern age is distinguished by a sort of mass 
consumption supported by the increasing wages pioneered by Henry Ford's notions of 
mass production. This led to changes in working-class response giving rise to the 
progressive unionism of the CIO as more representative of industrial labor than the older 
craft unions of the AFL. Denning also argues the modernist movements in art can also be 
seen as responsive to changes in "the corporate economy" prompting further changes in 
nearly every social relation (28). And though some of these distinguishing features may 
represent the current age as well as they reflect the era 1890-1 940, Denning suggests: 
That the moment of the Popular front-the age of the CIO-is usually 
only visible as an interregnum, a dead end, the "thirties," [as] a result [. . .] 
seeming to fall outside of those larger stories of modernism and 
postmoderinism [. . .I. However, the Popular Front, the age of the CIO, 
stands, not as another epoch, but as the promise of a different road beyond 
modernism, a road not taken, a vanishing mediator. It was a moment of 
transition b etween the F ordist modernism that reigned b efore the [ stock 
market] crash [of 19291, and the postmodernism of the American Century 
that emerged from the ruins of Hiroshima. (27) 
Obviously, the "moment of the Popular Front-the age of the CIO" is irreproducible. 
That it should be is not the argument. Rather, the Federal Theatre was the result of an era 
in flux and transition, dynamic attributes that also distinguish our own era, and such 
transitional periods demand response-and offer opportunity. 
To suggest that a "road not taken" be re-examined is not to suggest that any 
historical relic, including the Federal Theatre, be restored to function. It is more to the 
point to understand that the simple goal of the Project, to put unemployed actors to work, 
also produced a plethora of positive artistic outcomes, not the least being the discovery of 
a new mass audience for live performance. Neither does looking to the "Age of the CIO" 
for guidance suggest there is any hope that those times should or could return. Recreating 
the exact conditions of a historical moment isn't a requisite to redirecting social forces 
along lines such a moment might suggest. Any human value may find deeper expression 
in one era rather than another. It is more to the point to understand that those who lived 
and worked in the "Age of the CIO" were only attempting what is being attempted here: 
to understand the forces shaping the world, then and now, so a course of human action 
may be devised to respond to the demands those forces make upon us as individuals and 
as a society. 
Artists must accept the challenges society presents to human values in the 
historical moment in which they are encountered. It is clear that the world's economic 
structures, patterns of human migration and habitation, and national organization and 
ethnic allegiance are undergoing profound shifts. The system of national manufacture has 
been displaced by multi-national globalization. Agriculture is agribusiness, even in the 
undeveloped nations, and humanity is overwhelmingly an urban species. Technological 
changes now p roceed s o quickly that the w orld can b e apparently r einvented w ithin a 
generation's lifespan. Post-modemism is losing its place to the next historical phase, as 
yet undefined and unnamed. It is in these moments of transition that the hture is 
determined. It is in transition when creative human responses reveal unforeseen 
opportunity. That is the parallel between the experiments of the Popular Front and the 
dormant possibilities awaiting artists today. 
Robert H. Frank and Philip J Cook, in their economic study, The Winner-Take- 
All Society, suggest the contemporary prevalence of winner-take-all markets is "closely 
tied to the growth of competitive forces" (6). The difference in rewards to Olympic medal 
winners i llustrates this sort o f m arket 's reward allocation process. M ere fractions o f a  
second may be all that determines the outcome of a particular race yet the rewards 
offered to the winner in terms of product endorsement are rarely extended to the silver 
medallist and even less so to the bronze medallist. They both are unlikely to receive 
anything other than a historical footnote (29). The employment opportunities described 
for the m ajority o f p rofessional actors i llustrate w ell the w astefulness o f t his m arket's 
utilization of talent. Stardom and its rewards are not new phenomena, according to Frank 
and Cook, but "the rapid erosion of the barriers that once prevented the top performers 
from serving broader markets" is (45). Mass markets make possible and encourage the 
growth of winner-take-all markets despite the ineficient use of human resources. 
Consequently, the overwhelming competitive market force of media-corporation 
consolidation and the rapid growth of mass markets spurred on by technological 
developments are combining to define the post post-modem world as a winner-take-all 
society.. 
Winner-take-all markets continue by ignoring the inherent social costs. Frank and 
Cook liken the situation to environmental markets where the connection between, say the 
benefits of air conditioner usage and the resulting power consumption and pollution 
increases is often distant enough to ignore. Likewise, the social costs resulting from the 
"financial imperatives of achieving quick market success that have shaped popular 
culture" are easily ignored in the short run. In the long run, however, the " winner-take- 
all reward structure is especially troubling in light of evidence that, beginning in infancy 
and continuing throughout life, the things we see and read profoundly alter the kinds of 
people we become" (19). Frank and Cook argue: 
Winner-take-all markets attract too many contestants, result in inefficient 
patterns of investment and often degrade our culture. If these costs are to 
be avoided, firms and individuals must somehow be restrained from taking 
advantage of readily available profit opportunities. 
This does not mean, however, that detailed, prescriptive 
government regulation is the cure for all social ills. As conservatives have 
ably demonstrated, such regulations entail pitfalls all their own, often 
doing more harm than the problems they were designed to overcome. (1 9) 
How to restrain the media conglomerates and stars from their increasing relative share of 
the entertainment industry's profits in an age of decreasing taxes, increasing deregulation 
and growing corporate power is the difEcult question facing performers today. The 
challenge of "translat[ing] self-interested behavior in to socially effective outcomes" may 
be answered by "the same logic that justifies community intervention to curb 
environmental pollution [which] also supports the community's right to restructure the 
winner-take-all-reward system for the common good" (20). 
There is great opportunity in the commitment to build a new "name loyalty" one 
audience at a time. If the present era, like "the age of the CIO," is a period of transition 
where alternatives become the possible, it is then imperative actors begin to use the 
organizational clout they've invested in their unions to build a new sort of loyalty 
encompassing the entire profession, where actors matter not merely as individuals or 
''star" commodities, but as an important human social resource. Many more actors can 
earn the livelihood currently denied nearly 85% of them if Hollywood's system of 
industrial o rganization c an b e s upplemented with a n ew actors' theatre devoted t o the 
relationship between themselves and their audience. 
The performer's unions should seek to address the issue of job security for actors 
of every caliber by negotiating with the studios for industry-wide participation in all 
distributors' gross profits, as an "actors' rental fee." Such negotiations would require all 
the solidarity and fortitude necessary to bring labor's only real weapon to bear: the threat 
of strike. Once settled, this percentage of the distributors' gross could then create job 
opportunities for performers by endowing an artists' theatre along the lines of the Federal 
Theater Project. Such an artist-administered theater would make it possible for actors to 
work in their profession even when "between" professional engagements. It could also 
increase access to other benefits such as health and retirement that, being tied to the 
number of weeks worked by individual performers, are often, like professional 
employment, simply unrealized by the majority of the unions' membership. 
More importantly, this artists' theatre would more fully utilize the unique artistic 
resources of the performing arts industry. An industry-wide coalition of all the artistic 
guilds would encourage the artistic collaboration of actors, writers, directors, designers, 
and technicians fiee fiom commercial considerations that, together with an audience 
capable of so much more than simple consurnption+f sharing creativity and result in 
marvelously unforeseen artistic consequences. It could insure that the bond between 
performer and audience is never completely severed by the industry's increasing 
technological wizardry. And by insuring that bond, this artists' theatre could also insure 
that the imaginative reality shared between artists and audiences is not replaced by the 
virtual realities already being generated by computers. 
It is the responsibility of the performers, through their unions, to wrest the 
financial resources from the dominant corporate interests to secure their own working 
future. These corporate interests currently skim over 30% of gross profits as distribution 
fees before movie production profit is calculated (Vogel 104). It is clear that producers 
are not in the business of creating jobs for actors, nor should they be necessarily. Actors, 
however, have always been the basic input for the performing arts, though they have not 
always had to beg, hat in hand, for the opportunity to perform. 
The economic distress and humiliation that actors endured when locked out by 
producers during the organizational struggles of the past century has virtually become a 
way of life for the great majority of actors today. Whether an actor lives in forced 
idleness because of a producer's decision or the industry's structure, the result is the 
same. The performers' unions must reconsider their organization as craft unions and 
explore the possibilities of industrial trade unionism. They need to continue the 
cooperative trends most recently evidenced in the Broadway musicians' strike in 2003 
and continue strengthening relationships with the other creative and technical unions that 
support live theatre and movie production. Then together, they must demand, as do the 
industry's corporate owners, participation in the industry's gross profits. 
Through solidarity and the right to strike, actors, writers, directors, designers, and 
all the other human co-creators in the performing arts may secure the financial support to 
create their own performance opportunities. It is not a question of replacing the system as 
it has evolved, but of creating a new venue in a new relationship with the audience. 
Entirely subsidized by the gross participation points, artists could create new 
opportunities to work and explore their art. They could afford to seek new audiences 
wherever they may be found and re-establish a new relationship beyond the marketplace. 
So what, or who, is stopping them? It is easy to blame the "system," but 
participation in America's system of political economy is, ostensibly at least, entered into 
willingly by fiee individuals. Consequently, every individual bears some responsibility 
for the social conditions around us: 
Theatre people are still so much in the grip of an ideology that stresses the 
private and cosmopolitan that they feel threatened as individuals and 
creative persons by the thought of working in a collective setting. [. . .] 
But has creativity ever been an individual matter or is that a blindness 
imposed by the history of the arts under capitalist modes of production, a 
blindness t o  tracks 1 aid o ut b y  modem civil s ociety toward privacy and 
cosmopolitanism? Is there a greater freedom to be creative in running 
along that alienating pathway where the marketplace gods have 
overwhelming power than in the bosom of unpretentious welcoming 
cultures? (Spom 237) 
These questions go to the heart of art's relationship to society and the artists' relationship 
to their work. Capital's supremacy in our age encourages most artists and society to 
ignore these questions' ramifications. It may be quixotic to even consider that the artists 
of the performing arts industry might attempt to overcome the dividing strategy of the 
star system and re-invent the business unions that arose to bargain within it. Failing to 
try, however, will be to continue the deepening degradation of actors, the audience, and 
ultimately, society. 
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